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INTRODUCTION
Two recent trends on a likely collision course could dramatically alter
the employment relationship between public school districts and public
school teachers. Depending on one’s point of view, that change would
strip public school teachers of due process protection or grant school
districts important flexibility to better manage America’s failing
schools.
First, over the last few years, many state legislatures have adopted
statutory schemes tying public teachers’ employment to performance
evaluation ratings based largely on measures of student academic
achievement, such as test scores. 1 Second, over the last two decades,
the United States Supreme Court has signaled dissatisfaction with its
current approach to identifying property interests entitled to protection
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 and has also
placed new limits on the extent of public employees’ constitutional
rights. 3
Disputes between teachers and school districts over
employment decisions governed by performance-based employment
regimes could give the Court an opportunity, should it wish to take it, to
reverse four decades of precedent recognizing a protected property
interest in tenured public school teachers’ employment. 4
This Article explores how that provocative result could come about.
Part I reviews the Court’s prevailing analysis of public employees’
property interest in employment rooted in Board of Regents of State

1. See infra Part III.A–F (describing public teacher statutory evaluation schemes in Illinois,
Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida, and Oklahoma).
2. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 477–84 (1995); Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545
U.S. 748, 766–67 (2005).
3. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (equal protection); Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (speech). See also Ryan Keith Meyer, The United States Supreme
Court Eliminates the “Class-of-One” Equal Protection Claim in Public Employment, 48
WASHBURN L.J. 529, 529–30 (2009).
4. This Article focuses on public teachers’ due process rights in employment, but the trends
and analysis described herein could affect the due process rights of many other public employees.
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Colleges v. Roth and Perry v. Sindermann. 5 Under the “Roth/Perry
approach,” the Court determines whether an independent source of
authority constrains official discretion to remove a public employee,
such that the employee has a legitimate claim of entitlement to
employment that is protected by due process.
Part II analyzes four relatively recent Supreme Court cases. Two of
these cases show the Court’s discomfort with the Roth/Perry approach,
suggest an alternative framework for determining the presence of a
protected interest—the “atypical and significant hardship framework”—
and offer possible factors that could be used to implement that
framework—the “incidental benefit” and “intended benefit” factors. 6
The other two cases express the Court’s increasingly narrow view of
public employees’ constitutional rights. 7 All four cases emphasize two
themes that could be instrumental to formulating a new analysis of
public employment as property for due process purposes: (1) deference
to government officials; and (2) a focus on the intended scope of
claimed constitutional protection.
Part III surveys new performance-based statutory schemes governing
public teachers’ employment in Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho,
Florida, and Oklahoma. Part IV then shows how the Roth/Perry
approach would apply to these statutory schemes, and why the Court
could abandon that analysis in favor of the atypical and significant
hardship framework. Finally, Part V tests how the atypical and
significant hardship framework could be applied in the public teacher
employment context. Part V also shows how the intended benefit
factor, rather than the incidental benefit factor, could be used to
implement the atypical and significant hardship test. This Article
contends that tenured teachers in the six states analyzed herein would
not have a protected interest in employment if the Court applied the
intended benefit factor to these statutory schemes. Accordingly,
abandoning the Roth/Perry approach in favor of the atypical and
significant hardship framework could shatter forty years of settled law
recognizing tenured teachers’ due process rights.

5. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593 (1972).
6. See infra Part II.A.1–2 (discussing Sandin v. Conner and Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales).
As will be discussed, the incidental benefit factor would not afford due process protection to any
interest that arises merely as an incident to the provision of a traditional government service,
while the intended benefit factor would only recognize such protection if state officials intended
to confer a right or benefit on a regulated person.
7. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing Garcetti v. Ceballos and Engquist v. Oregon Department
of Agriculture).
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I. PREVAILING LAW: THE ROTH/PERRY APPROACH
A. Before Roth and Perry
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution provide that the government may not deprive a person of
“life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” 8 Accordingly, a
threshold question when a party asserts a due process violation is
whether the deprived interest is “liberty” or “property.” 9 The
government may not deprive a person of an interest protected by due
process without first giving the person an opportunity for a hearing. 10
The amount of required pre-deprivation process depends on balancing
the individual’s and government’s interests and increases to the extent
that the balance tips in favor of the individual. 11 Whether an interest is
“property” is relevant when a government entity gives something to a
person, such as public assistance or a job, and subsequently takes it
away. 12
The Court’s approach to determining whether a property interest is
protected by due process has changed over time. Before Roth and
Perry, the Court protected interests that it deemed were “rights” rather
than “privileges.” 13 For instance, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held
that a public assistance recipient had a protected interest in continued
benefits. 14 The Court asserted that deprivation of public assistance
“involves state action that adjudicates important rights.” 15 In the
Court’s view, the parties could not frame public assistance as a

8. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment describes the legal
obligation of the federal government to afford its citizens due process, while the Fourteenth
Amendment, ratified in 1868, uses the same language as the Fifth Amendment to ensure that
states provide due process to their residents.
9. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 570–71.
10. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).
11. See id. at 333–35. Specifically, a court must consider three factors to determine the extent
of pre-deprivation process due to an individual: (1) the private interest affected by the
government’s action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest and the likely added
protection of additional procedure; and (3) the government’s interest, including the government
function at issue and the burden imposed on the government by providing additional process. Id.
at 335.
12. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (public assistance); Bd. of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (public employment).
13. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261–62. See also Patrick M. Garry, The Constitutional
Relevance of the Employer-Sovereign Relationship: Examining the Due Process Rights of
Government Employees in Light of the Public Employee Speech Doctrine, 81 ST. JOHNS. L. REV.
797, 799–801 (2007) (discussing due process rights of public employees).
14. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261–62.
15. Id. (emphasis added).
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“privilege.” 16 Therefore, the government could not terminate public
assistance without due process. 17 Six years later, however, the Court in
Roth and Perry expressly rejected continued use of the right versus
privilege test and set forth a new analysis to determine whether a
government-provided interest is “property” protected by due process. 18
B. Setting the Standard: Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth
Roth replaced the standardless right versus privilege test with a new
approach that recognized a protected property interest when state or
local laws, rules, or policies gave a regulated person a legitimate claim
of entitlement to a government-provided interest. 19 In Roth, the Court
held that a public university professor did not have a protected property
interest in employment. 20 The professor had a one-year appointment at
a state university. 21 The university did not rehire the professor after the
appointment expired and did not provide him with an opportunity to
challenge the decision. 22 The professor sued, claiming that the
university violated his due process rights. 23 The Court explained that
“property” is broader than ownership of real estate, chattels or money in
the due process context. 24 While broad, protected “property” did not
include merely an “abstract need or desire” for, or a “unilateral
expectation” of, a given interest. 25 Rather, a person must have a
“legitimate claim of entitlement” to an interest, reliance upon which
“must not be arbitrarily undermined,” to receive due process
protection. 26
The Court also explained that protected interests arose from “existing
rules or understandings . . . that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to those benefits.” 27 But, the Constitution did not
supply those rules or understandings. 28 Instead, an “independent source
such as state law” determined whether a person had a legitimate claim
of entitlement to an interest. 29
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 262.
Id.
Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
Id. at 577.
Id. at 578.
Id. at 566.
Id.
Id. at 568–69.
See id. at 571–72.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. To support its new mode of analysis, the Court reframed Goldberg, stating that the
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The Court applied this framework to the independent sources of
authority available in Roth: state statutes, the professor’s appointment
letter, and administrative rules. 30 Although Wisconsin statutes provided
that professors who worked four continuous years acquired tenure,
which entitles professors to continued employment absent just cause,
the statutes did not address rehiring of nontenured professors with
annual appointments. 31 The professor’s appointment letter stated that
employment was for one year and did not promise renewal. 32
Accordingly, the Court concluded that Wisconsin state universities had
“unfettered discretion” to rehire nontenured professors on one-year
contracts. 33 Those professors were “entitled to nothing” other than a
one-year appointment. 34 Therefore, the nontenured professor in Roth
did not have a property interest in employment protected by procedural
due process. 35
C. Elaborating the Standard: Perry v. Sindermann
Perry, decided the same day as Roth using the same analysis, held
that tenured public professors, who cannot be dismissed except for
cause, have a property interest in employment protected by due
process. 36 Additionally, professors without formal tenure nevertheless
could have de facto tenure if state officials fostered an understanding of
job security through informal sources of authority. 37
In Perry, a Texas state college did not rehire a professor on a oneyear employment contract and did not give the professor an opportunity
for a hearing. 38 Unlike Roth, the professor had worked at the same state
college under four consecutive one-year contracts. 39 Immediately
plaintiff had had a protected interest in public assistance benefits because she had a claim of
entitlement rooted in the state statute setting forth eligibility criteria. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577.
However, the Court’s reasoning in Roth was a departure from Goldberg’s right versus privilege
analysis. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261–62 (1970).
30. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 566–67, 578.
31. Id. at 566–67.
32. Id. at 578.
33. Id. at 567.
34. Id. at 566.
35. Id. at 578. Roth implied that tenured state university professors had a property interest in
employment because under state law they were “entitled to continued employment ‘during
efficiency and good behavior.’” Id. at 566. The Court’s emphasis on the absence of statutory,
contractual, or administrative requirements to rehire the nontenured professor suggested that the
presence of just-cause provisions would create a legitimate claim of entitlement to employment
protected by procedural due process. See id. at 566–68.
36. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972).
37. Id. at 600–02.
38. Id. at 595.
39. Id. at 594.
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before, he had worked at two other Texas state colleges for six
consecutive years. 40 Yet, the professor did not have tenure because the
college lacked a tenure system. 41
The professor’s nontenured status was “highly relevant” to, but not
dispositive of, his due process claim. 42 Referring to Roth, the Court
stated: “[T]he Constitution does not require the opportunity for a
hearing before the nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher’s contract, unless
he can show . . . that he had a ‘property’ interest in continued
employment, despite the lack of tenure.” 43 The professor’s allegations
in Perry that the college’s faculty guide and the university system’s
policy guidelines created a de facto tenure program were sufficient to
create a “genuine issue as to his interest in continued employment.” 44
The Court reversed summary judgment against the professor because
“the existence of rules and understandings, promulgated and fostered by
state officials, . . . may justify [the professor’s] legitimate claim of
entitlement to continued employment absent ‘sufficient cause.’” 45
The Court drew an analogy between the use of informal sources to
find implied contracts between an employer and employee and to find
implied tenure. 46 Workplaces could have “an unwritten ‘common law’”
that employees will receive job security equivalent to formal tenure. 47
The Court’s due process analysis hinged primarily on “mutually explicit
understandings that support [an employee’s] claim of entitlement to the
benefit.” 48
D. “Discretion Formulation” of the Roth/Perry Approach
Many courts have employed a heuristic to apply the Roth/Perry test:
whether a source of authority gives government officials discretion to
deprive a person of an interest. 49 This “discretion formulation” likely
40. Id.
41. Id. at 596, 599.
42. Id. at 599.
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. at 599–600.
45. Id. at 602–03.
46. Id. at 602.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 601.
49. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345 (1976) (finding that because a state court
construed state law to provide no guarantee of employment to a police officer, the police
department had discretion to terminate the police officer, who had no property interest in his job);
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (stating that “to have a property
interest in a benefit” a person must “have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it” and that “our
cases recognize that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or
deny it in their discretion”). Gonzales suggests that the Court is ready to depart from the
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arises from language in Roth—the professor did not have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to employment because state officials had
“unfettered discretion” not to hire him. 50 If a government employer has
discretion to remove an employee, then the employee cannot plausibly
claim entitlement to employment. Until recently, the Court used a
similar analysis to determine the presence of a protected liberty interest
when prisoners claimed due process violations. 51
II. REGRET AND RETRENCHMENT
Although good law for over forty years, the Court showed discomfort
with the Roth/Perry approach in Sandin v. Conner 52 and Town of Castle
Rock v. Gonzales. 53 Conner effectively overruled use of the discretion
formulation in the prisoner/liberty context, paving the way for a similar
move in the public employment/property context. Gonzales assumed an
analytic posture at loggerheads with the Roth/Perry approach, failed
faithfully to apply it, and imposed novel requirements for finding a
protected property interest. Both cases showed great deference to
government employers and analyzed whether the asserted interest fell
within the intended scope of due process protection. Conner and
Gonzales also furnish rationales for abandoning the Roth/Perry analysis
in favor of the atypical and significant hardship test, and offer two
possible factors to implement the atypical and significant hardship
framework—the incidental and intended benefits factors.
The Court also recently limited public employees’ speech and equal
protection rights in Garcetti v. Ceballos 54 and Engquist v. Oregon. 55
Ceballos and Engquist demonstrate the Court’s growing tendency to
narrow public employees’ constitutional rights based on deference to
government employers and a limited view of the intended scope of
constitutional rights. Accordingly, Ceballos and Engquist further
support the likelihood that the Court will change its analysis of property
for due process purposes, even (or perhaps especially) if doing so could
diminish public teachers’ due process rights.
Roth/Perry approach and provides a partial basis for a potential new mode of analysis to
determine the presence of a protected property interest. However, the Court purported to apply
the Roth/Perry analysis in Gonzales and properly recited its standards.
50. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 567 (1972).
51. See, e.g., Ky. Dep’t. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462–63 (1989) (holding
that prisoners had no protected interest in visitation rights because regulation did not restrict
official discretion to grant or deny visitation).
52. 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
53. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
54. 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
55. 553 U.S. 591 (2008).
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A. Seeds of Regret: Dissatisfaction with Roth/Perry in Due Process
Cases
1. Sandin v. Conner
In Conner, the Court expressly departed from precedent when it held
that a state prisoner did not have a liberty interest protected by due
process. 56 A prison adjustment committee had found the prisoner guilty
of misconduct and sentenced him to solitary confinement, refusing the
prisoner’s request to call witnesses at a disciplinary hearing. 57 The
prisoner claimed that the committee deprived him of liberty without due
process. 58 The Court disagreed, stating that it would “reexamine the
circumstances under which state prison regulations afford inmates a
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.” 59
The Court’s decision broke with a line of cases beginning in 1974,
two years after Roth and Perry, that, similar to the discretion
formulation, found a protected liberty interest when regulations
constrained official discretion to deprive inmates of liberty. 60 The
Court expressed three reasons for abandoning that methodology. 61
First, the discretion formulation encouraged prisoners to find
regulations stated in mandatory terms to support claims of entitlement,
even when those regulations were not intended to confer rights on
prisoners. 62 Second, the discretion formulation gave state officials an
incentive to avoid creating protected interests by crafting regulations
that gave officials excessive discretion, which enhanced the risk of
inconsistent and unfair treatment of inmates. 63 Third, the discretion
formulation drew federal courts into the mechanics of prison
56. Conner, 515 U.S. at 487.
57. Id. at 475–76.
58. Id. at 476.
59. Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 477–84.
61. See id. at 481–84. The Court noted, however, that “technically” it need not overrule any
prior holdings. Id. at 484 n.5. According to the Court, Conner would not change the result in one
case because the plaintiff was given all of the process required by the Constitution, and therefore
the Court did not need to reach the question of whether a protected liberty interest existed. Id.
With respect to two other cases, the Court stated that it had found no liberty interest using the
discretion formulation, implying that the outcomes in those cases would have been the same
under the discretion formulation and the standard adopted in Conner. See id. The Court did not
explain why it assumed that the standard adopted in Conner could not lead to finding a protected
liberty interest, thereby overruling prior cases. This lack of explanation implies that, compared to
the discretion formulation, the Conner standard would capture a more limited range of interests
entitled to due process protection as “liberty.”
62. Id. at 481–82. Put differently, the liberty interest fell outside the intended scope of the
regulation’s protection. See id.
63. Id. at 482.
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management, which harmed judicial economy and showed too little
deference to state and local officials. 64 Two of the Court’s concerns—
that a claimed interest could fall outside the intended scope of
protection and that courts show deference to state and local officials—
are also significant factors in Gonzales, 65 as well as Ceballos and
Engquist, 66 suggesting that those factors could play an important role in
a possible new approach to determining public employees’ due process
rights.
The Court reverted to the approach it had used in liberty cases before
the Roth/Perry discretion formulation: a regulation creates an interest
protected by due process when it “imposes atypical and significant
hardship” with respect to “the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 67 The
Court concluded that the regulation providing for solitary confinement
did not impose an atypical and significant hardship on the prisoner
because solitary confinement was not much harsher than general prison
conditions. 68
The Conner approach departs from the Roth/Perry approach because
it does not inquire whether a person has a legitimate claim of
entitlement to an interest. The Conner approach ignores expectancy or
reliance and focuses solely on whether the regulation’s deprivation
imposes atypical and significant hardship. 69 In other words, the
atypical and significant hardship framework tests whether a regulation
that deprives a person of an interest imposes an excessive burden on
that person in the totality of circumstances. The Conner approach is
problematic, however, because it requires subjective decisions about the
nature and extent of hardship. 70 The Court did not identify any
standards to determine when a regulation is harsh enough to trigger due
process protection. 71 Accordingly, the incidental and intended benefit
factors, as discussed in Part V, are needed to implement the atypical and
significant hardship framework.
Conner’s atypical and significant hardship test is not limited to the
prisoner/liberty context. Justice Breyer attempted to distinguish the
property and liberty contexts, arguing that the Roth/Perry methodology
protects reliance on an entitlement, whereas analysis of official
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id.
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing Gonzales).
See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing Ceballos and Engquist).
Id. at 483–84.
Id. at 485–86.
See id.
See id. at 496 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. at 483–84 (majority opinion).

1_CAMILLUCCI

602

3/9/2013 1:31 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

discretion in the prisoner/liberty context assures appropriate “absence of
government restraint . . . that we call freedom.” 72 However, he also
acknowledged that a restraint on official discretion to impair prisoner
liberty suggests “that the inmate will have thought that he himself,
through control of his own behavior, could have avoided the
deprivation” and therefore could “have believed that (in the absence of
his misbehavior) the restraint fell outside the ‘sentence imposed’ upon
him.” 73 Thus, Justice Breyer inadvertently proved that analyzing
official discretion in the prisoner/liberty context protected prisoners’
reliance interests, just as the discretion formulation protects public
employees’ reliance on employment.
Because the purposes behind evaluating official discretion in the
liberty and property contexts are similar, the logic behind abandoning
that analysis in the liberty context could be imported to the property
context. The Court could worry about recognizing due process rights in
public teachers’ employment when state officials did not intend to
confer rights on public teachers, encouraging grants of excessive
official discretion that could be abused and judicial meddling in local
governmental affairs. Moreover, Conner’s atypical and significant
hardship framework could be used to determine whether, in the totality
of the circumstances, a regulation’s deprivation of public teachers’
employment is sufficiently burdensome to trigger due process
protection.
2. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales
Gonzales further undermined the continued viability of the
Roth/Perry approach. In Gonzales, the Court held that a woman did not
have a property interest in enforcement of a restraining order against her
husband. 74 Early in the opinion, the Court assumed an analytic posture
fundamentally inconsistent with the Roth/Perry approach:
We will not, of course, defer to the Tenth Circuit on the ultimate issue:
whether what Colorado law has given respondent constitutes a
property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. That
determination, despite its state-law underpinnings, is ultimately one of
federal constitutional law. “Although the underlying substantive
interest is created by ‘an independent source such as state law,’ federal
constitutional law determines whether that interest rises to the level of

72. Id. at 498 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73. Id.
74. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 768 (2005).
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a ‘legitimate claim of entitlement’ protected by the Due Process
Clause.” 75

The Court acknowledged that state law created an “underlying
substantive interest,” but it declared that federal constitutional law
decided whether that interest was protected by due process. This
statement is a departure from Roth, which did not distinguish between
substantive and constitutional interests. Roth expressly stated that
protected property interests are defined by independent sources of
authority, such as state law, rather than the Constitution. 76
Consistent with that salvo, the Court paid lip service to, but did not
faithfully apply, the Roth/Perry discretion formulation. Colorado law
provided that a police officer “shall use every reasonable means to
enforce a restraining order” and “shall arrest, or . . . seek a warrant for
the arrest of a restrained person” when the officer has probable cause to
believe that a restrained person has violated a restraining order. 77 These
provisions cabin officers’ discretion to decline enforcement. 78
However, the Court did “not believe that these provisions of Colorado
law truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory” because
of a long history deferring to police officers’ discretion to make
enforcement decisions. 79 Accordingly, the Court held that the plaintiff
did not have a protected interest in enforcement of the restraining order,
notwithstanding the constraint on discretion in Colorado’s statute. 80
Similar to Conner, as well as Ceballos and Engquist, 81 the Court’s
decision reflected a belief that the claimed interest did not fall within
the intended scope of constitutional protection and did not show
appropriate deference to local officials.
Other aspects of Gonzales also show discomfort with the Roth/Perry
approach. While the Court likely wished to avoid transforming police

75. Id. at 756–57 (quoting Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9 (1978))
(emphasis added).
76. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See also Joel A.
Hugenberger, Note, Redefining Property under the Due Process: Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales and the Demise of the Positive Law Approach, 47 B.C. L. REV. 773, 802 (2006).
Moreover, the Court’s reliance on Memphis Light was misguided. Id. There, the Court found
that the Constitution can give rise to a property interest protected by procedural due process if
state law does not. Id. However, Memphis Light does not support the proposition that when state
law defines a property interest, the Constitution can preempt state law and strip the state-created
interest of protection. Id.
77. Gonzales, 408 U.S. at 758–59.
78. Hugenberger, supra note 76, at 798–99.
79. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 760.
80. Id. at 766.
81. See infra Part II.B.1–2 (discussing Ceballos and Engquist).
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protection into a fundamental right, 82 it could have limited its holding to
the context of police enforcement to avoid undercutting Roth.
Moreover, Gonzales “reveals a deep skepticism of non-traditional forms
of property.” 83 The Court, in claiming that the enforcement of a
restraining order “would not . . . resemble any traditional conception of
property,” 84 showed an attitude at loggerheads with Roth’s broad
conception of property. 85 Instead of limiting its holding, the Court
dismissively marginalized an interest in a restraining order as
“nontraditional” property, 86 which also marginalized the Roth/Perry
approach.
Furthermore, the Court set forth two novel criteria for finding a
protected property interest, creating additional tension with the
Roth/Perry approach. 87 First, a protected property interest must have
“some ascertainable monetary value.” 88 Second, such an interest must
not be merely incidental to the provision of a traditional government
service. 89 According to the Court, the right to enforcement of a
restraining order met neither criterion 90—a holding that underscores its
departure from Roth’s broad view of protected property.
As Parts IV and V demonstrate, the Court could invoke rationales
from Conner and Gonzales to justify discarding the Roth/Perry
approach. Moreover, it could derive the incidental benefit and intended
benefit factors from Gonzales and Conner, respectively, as possible
ways to implement Conner’s atypical and significant hardship
framework in the property context. In Gonzales, the Court stated that
due process does not protect interests that arise as a mere incident to the
provision of a traditional government service. 91 Under the incidental
benefit factor, deprivation of an interest that is merely incidental to a
traditional government service would not impose an atypical and
significant hardship on a due process claimant. In Conner, the prisoner
did not have a protected liberty interest because the regulation that
82. Hugenberger, supra note 76, at 801. Hugenberger believes that risk was limited. See id.
83. Id.
84. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 766.
85. Roth defined “property” to include everything on a continuum from “real estate, chattels
or money” up to, but not including, an “abstract need or desire” for, or a “unilateral expectation”
of, an interest. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572, 577 (1972).
86. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 766 (“Such a right would not, of course, resemble any
traditional conception of property.”).
87. See id. at 766–67.
88. Id. at 766.
89. Id. at 767. The Court’s use of this criterion is the basis for this Article’s proposed
incidental benefit factor, discussed infra Part V.
90. See id. at 766–67.
91. See id.
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created the interest was “not designed to confer rights on inmates.” 92
Under the intended benefit factor, deprivation of an interest that was not
intended to convey a benefit or right on the claimant would not impose
an atypical and significant hardship. Although the incidental benefit
factor is not consistent with the Court’s due process tradition in the
public employment context, application of the intended benefit factor
would strip tenured public teachers of a protected property interest in
employment.
B. Signs of Retrenchment: Restricting Public Employees’
Constitutional Rights
Parallel to the Court’s trend away from the Roth/Perry approach, the
Court also has limited public employees’ constitutional rights in
Garcetti v. Ceballos 93 and Engquist v. Oregon, 94 perhaps
foreshadowing a comparable limitation on public teachers’ due process
rights. Though not the focus of this Article, Ceballos and Engquist
reflect themes found in Conner and Gonzales: a narrow view of the
intended scope of constitutional rights and great deference to the
interests of government employers.
Additionally, Ceballos and
Engquist produced novel results that could pave the way for similar
innovation in the procedural due process context.
1. Speech: Garcetti v. Ceballos
In Ceballos, the Court invoked themes reminiscent of Conner and
Gonzales to restrict public employees’ free speech rights. The Court
used its traditional two-part analysis to determine whether a government
employer’s restriction on speech violated a public employee’s First
Amendment rights: (1) whether the public employee spoke as a citizen
on a matter of public concern; and (2) if so, whether the employee’s
First Amendment interest outweighed the government’s interest as
employer. 95 The Ceballos Court held that the First Amendment did not
protect speech uttered by an assistant district attorney when he
expressed concerns to his supervisor about an affidavit used to obtain a
search warrant. 96 Echoing Conner and Gonzales, the Court’s new
categorical rule reflected an assumption that the First Amendment was
not intended to protect public employees’ speech uttered during the
course of employment: “when public employees make statements
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995).
547 U.S. 410 (2006) (free speech).
553 U.S. 591 (2008) (equal protection).
Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 418.
Id. at 420–21.
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pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not
insulate their communications from employer discipline.” 97 Restricting
such speech did not constrain any First Amendment right that a public
employee would have as a citizen, which, the Court suggested, was the
type of interest that the First Amendment was intended to protect. 98
Also consistent with Conner and Gonzales, limiting public
employees’ speech uttered pursuant to official duties was a legitimate
exercise of an employer’s prerogative to manage the workplace. 99
Subjecting such speech to the same scrutiny as citizen speech on matters
of public concern would require judges to oversee government affairs
“to a degree inconsistent with sound principles of federalism and
separation of powers.” 100 The Court’s emphasis on the intended scope
of constitutional protection and deference to local government officials
to narrow the constitutional rights at issue in Conner, Gonzales, and
Ceballos suggests that the same themes could play a significant role in a
future case redefining due process property rights in public
employment.
2. Equal Protection: Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture
In Engquist, the Court again demonstrated a narrow view of public
employees’ constitutional rights and broad deference to government
employers by holding that public employees categorically could not
bring “class-of-one” equal protection claims. 101 A former government
employee, whose state position was eliminated, alleged under a classof-one theory that she was dismissed arbitrarily and with malicious
intent. 102 Generally, equal protection claims allege that a government
actor arbitrarily treated members of a class differently than similarly
situated people. 103 However, the Court has recognized that an
individual can claim a class-of-one equal protection violation when a
97. Id. at 421. The Court was sharply divided over this new rule, yet the majority’s reasoning
was rooted in the Court’s two-step First Amendment balancing tradition. The Court held in step
one that employee speech made pursuant to job duties per se does not involve a matter of public
concern. Technically, the Court did not need to reach the second step, but the Court nevertheless
balanced the assistant district attorney’s interest in speech and the government’s interest in
management, finding in the government’s favor. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis was
consistent with its First Amendment tradition in public employment cases, even if the majority’s
categorical rule was novel and controversial.
98. Id. at 421–22.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 423.
101. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 594 (2008).
102. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 595.
103. Meyer, supra note 3, at 530.
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government entity intentionally and without a rational basis treats the
individual differently than similarly situated people. 104 The Court had
not suggested that the class-of-one theory was limited. 105
Nevertheless, the Court rejected Engquist’s claim. 106 The Court
stated two principles that reflected its focus on the intended scope of
constitutional protection and deference to government employers—
further affirming the importance of the common principles in Conner,
Gonzales, and Ceballos, and perhaps foreshadowing a break from the
Roth/Perry approach.
First, although government employees do not lose their constitutional
rights when they accept their positions, those rights must be balanced
against the realities of the employment context. Second, in striking
the appropriate balance, we consider whether the asserted employee
right implicates the basic concerns of the relevant constitutional
provision, or whether the claimed right can more readily give way to
the requirements of the government as employer. 107

The Court concluded that class-of-one claims were “a poor fit for the
public employment context,” 108 in part because the Equal Protection
Clause was not intended to protect individual public employees. 109
Moreover, the Court found that the “government has significantly
greater leeway in its dealings with citizen employees than it does when
it brings its sovereign power to bear on citizens at large.” 110 In
Engquist, government employers engaged in “discretionary
104. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). Olech sued the Village
of Willowbrook for violation of her equal protection rights because the Village demanded that
Olech provide a thirty-three-foot easement on her property in exchange for connection to the
Village water supply, but only sought fifteen-foot easements from other similarly situated
residents. Id. at 563.
105. See id. (“‘[T]he purpose of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is
to secure every person within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary
discrimination, whether occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through duly constituted agents.’” (quoting Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441,
445 (1923) (emphasis added))). One commentator has argued that Olech’s holding recognizing
class-of-one claims “was not a change in the law” but instead was “a reminder of what had
always been a valid cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause.” Matthew C. Juneau,
Surgery or Butchery? Engquist v. Oregon, Class-of-one Equal Protection, and the Shift to
Categorical Treatment of Public Employees’ Constitutional Claims, 70 LA. L. REV. 313, 320
(2009). Indeed, before Engquist, seven U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals permitted class-of-one
claims by public employees. See Meyer, supra note 3, at 530. The Ninth Circuit held in
Engquist, however, that a public employee could not bring a class-of-one claim, which created a
circuit split before the Court took the case. Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 478 F.3d 985, 992–
96 (9th Cir. 2007), aff’d, 553 U.S. 591 (2008).
106. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 594.
107. Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 605.
109. Id. at 607.
110. Id. at 599. However, the Court did not cite Ceballos for this proposition.
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decisionmaking” that necessarily resulted in treating similar people
differently. 111
Because those decisions were “subjective and
individualized,” 112 however, deference to the government’s interest in
efficient management favored barring class-of-one claims by public
employees. 113
Thus, similar to Conner, Ceballos, and Gonzales, the Court found
that Engquist’s interest was not within the intended scope of protection
afforded by the Equal Protection Clause and showed great deference to
government employers. The Court could invoke similar themes to
justify adopting an alternative analysis to the Roth/Perry approach in
the context of public teachers’ due process rights.
3. Implications: Common Trend, Separate Traditions
Ceballos and Engquist show that the seeds of regret in Conner and
Gonzales are consistent with the Court’s trend to limit public
employees’ constitutional rights based on a narrow construction of the
intended scope of constitutional protections and deference to
government employers. Some commentators have argued that the Court
could or should draw on Ceballos and Engquist to adopt a categorical
rule to deny public employees a protected property interest in
employment, but they overlook the different precedential traditions
governing speech, class-of-one, and procedural due process claims. 114
111. Id. at 603. The plaintiff in Engquist alleged that she was singled out for adverse
treatment as compared to other similarly situated employees in her agency due to her supervisor’s
and coworkers’ animosity toward her. Id. at 595.
112. Id. at 604. The Court assumed that at-will employment was the default rule in the public
employment context unless legislation provided otherwise. Id. at 606. The class-of-one theory,
according to the Court, was inconsistent with at-will employment. Id. Although the Court
acknowledged that many governments modified at-will employment to some form of just-cause
employment, that choice was a “legislative grace.” Id. at 607. Because many government
employment schemes retained at-will employment for some workers and not others, permitting
class-of-one equal protection claims in the public employment context could upset those
comprehensive regimes by giving at-will employees a remedy against arbitrary dismissal. Id.
113. See id. (“Government offices could not function if every employment decision became a
constitutional matter.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
114. Garry observes historical parallels between the growth of public employees’ First
Amendment and due process rights after the 1950s. He argues that the Court “corrected”
expansion of First Amendment rights in Ceballos and should do the same with respect to due
process rights; thus, the Court should adopt the citizen/public employee distinction in the due
process context. See Garry, supra note 13, at 807. However, historical parallels do not explain
why reasoning rooted in the Court’s First Amendment tradition should be used in due process
cases. The citizen/employee distinction is consistent with First Amendment tradition, the first
prong of which asked whether public employees spoke as citizens on matters of public concern.
By contrast, the due process tradition never has considered the status or role of a public
employee. Although Gonzales suggests that the Court wishes to narrow the range of interests
protected by due process, drawing on due process precedent, not First Amendment precedent,
would be a more persuasive rationale for doing so.
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Whereas the Court denied protection to public employee speech in
Ceballos based on its First Amendment balancing tradition and adopted
similar reasoning in Engquist due to the absence of any class-of-one
tradition, 115 procedural due process rights are governed by an
independent tradition that does not support a per se rule denying public
employees a protected interest in employment. 116 Rather than draw on
First Amendment and class-of-one cases, the Court could fashion a
more persuasive justification for abandoning the Roth/Perry approach
and developing an alternative mode of analysis from its due process
tradition. Part V shows that the Court could develop a new approach to
determining the presence of a protected property interest that is rooted
in due process precedent. Accordingly, the Court could address its
concerns with the Roth/Perry approach without making arbitrary
analogies to the traditions governing other constitutional rights, such as
free speech and equal protection.

Juneau also argues that Engquist’s categorical rule could be used to deny public employees due
process protection. Juneau, supra note 105, at 348–50. According to Juneau, Engquist sought to
prevent federal judicial involvement in a deluge of public employee claims, and the Court could
categorically deny public employees a protected interest in employment for a similar reason.
Although the Court has qualms about meddling with government employers’ decisions, that is not
a persuasive basis for adopting a citizen/employee dichotomy in due process cases. The Court’s
effort in Engquist to show that the public employee/citizen distinction had support in due process
precedent was misleading and unfounded. The Court cited Bishop v. Wood for the proposition
that the Due Process Clause does not guarantee public employees protection from dismissal.
Engquist, 553 U.S. at 599 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 350 (1976)). That statement,
though accurate, does not show that public employment categorically is not protected property.
In any context, due process only guarantees an opportunity for a hearing. Neither Bishop nor
Engquist suggests that public employees categorically have no right to due process. See id. at
595. The Court could more persuasively address concerns about deference in due process cases
by developing an alternative framework for identifying a protected interest that is grounded in
due process tradition.
115. Engquist relied mostly on First Amendment cases to distinguish class-of-one claims
brought by public employees and citizens, and to limit use of the class-of-one theory by the
former. Meyer, supra note 3, at 556–57. However, even in the class-of-one context, where no
tradition comparable to the procedural due process tradition existed, the Court’s analogy to First
Amendment cases has been criticized because the government’s power to regulate employee
speech is more closely related to its legitimate interest in efficient operations than its power
arbitrarily to treat individual public employees differently than similarly-situated peers. See id. at
556–60.
116. The due process tradition governing the identification of protected interests in public
employment does not balance the interests of public employees and government employers or
look to whether a person’s status is “public employee” or “citizen.” Rather, it examines the
nature of a person’s asserted interest, namely whether an independent source of authority creates
a legitimate claim of entitlement to that interest. See supra Part I.B–C.
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III. SELECT STATE PERFORMANCE-BASED PUBLIC TEACHER
EMPLOYMENT STATUTES
Parallel to the Court’s evolving view of interests protected by due
process and public employees’ constitutional rights, many states have
adopted statutory schemes governing public teacher employment that
link employment decisions to teachers’ performance evaluation
ratings. 117 Measures of a teacher’s performance must be based in large
part on the performance of his or her students on standardized tests—the
goal being to reward and retain teachers who contribute to student
academic growth and remove teachers who do not. Challenging that
principle is difficult. However, many teachers worry that too closely
linking teacher performance to student performance unfairly holds
teachers responsible for factors influencing student achievement beyond
teachers’ control. Perhaps because of this concern, states have devised
varied formulas for evaluating teacher performance that incorporate
both student test scores and other factors, such as teachers’ preparation
and pedagogical methods.
Disputes between public school teachers and school districts over
adverse employment decisions made pursuant to new state regimes
could give the Court an opportunity to reevaluate whether tenured
public teachers’ employment is protected by due process. This Part
summarizes the important features of performance-based schemes in six
states: Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida, and Oklahoma.
Together, these states offer geographic and topographic diversity, as
well as an array of strategies to link teacher performance to
employment. Evaluating the statutes in these states conveys a sense of
how legislatures representing different parts of the country have sought
to implement performance-based systems governing public teachers’
employment.
A. Illinois
In Illinois, every school district must evaluate probationary teachers
annually and tenured teachers biennially. 118 However, a tenured
teacher who receives ratings of “needs improvement” or

117. The federal government’s Race to the Top Initiative encouraged states to develop such
performance-based regimes. See generally Overview Information; Race to the Top Fund
Assessment Program; Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010,
75 Fed. Reg. 68, 18171 (Apr. 9, 2010), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-0409/pdf/2010-8176.pdf.
The Department of Education conditioned large grants on the
development and implementation of systems to evaluate teacher performance and inform
employment decisions. Id.
118. 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/24A-5(1)–(2) (West 2012).
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“unsatisfactory” must be evaluated in the following year. 119 All
teachers in Illinois must be rated as “excellent,” “proficient,” “needs
improvement,” or “unsatisfactory.” 120 District evaluations must include
student growth data as “a significant factor” in rating teacher
performance. 121
Performance evaluation ratings affect teachers’ employment status.
For instance, they determine the length of time a probationary teacher
must work before attaining tenure status. 122 Once teachers become
tenured, performance evaluation ratings can lead to dismissal for just
cause or on the basis of performance. 123 If a tenured teacher receives a
“needs improvement” performance rating, then the evaluator must
create a “professional development plan” designed to improve the
teacher’s performance. 124 Similarly, if a tenured teacher receives an
“unsatisfactory” rating and the evaluator deems the teacher’s deficits
remediable, then the evaluator must develop a ninety-day “remediation
plan,” upon which the evaluator will reevaluate the teacher. 125 If the
teacher receives a remediation plan rating of “needs improvement” or
“unsatisfactory,” the evaluator may recommend dismissal of the
teacher. 126 Even if a tenured teacher obtains a remediation plan rating
of “proficient” or better, a school may dismiss the teacher without
another remediation plan if that teacher subsequently receives an
“unsatisfactory” rating within the next three years. 127 Additionally, a
school district may dismiss a teacher without providing a remediation
plan for “deficiencies which are deemed irremediable.” 128 Therefore,
although remediation plans often give tenured teachers an extra layer of
protection against dismissal on the basis of performance ratings,
evaluators may avoid use of remediation plans by deeming a teacher’s
deficiencies irremediable. 129
Performance evaluation ratings also determine the order in which
tenured teachers may be laid off and influence which tenured teachers
119. Id. § 5/24A-5(2).
120. Id. § 5/24A-5(e).
121. Id. § 5/24A-5(c).
122. See id. §§ 5/24-11(d)(1)–(3), 5/34-84.
123. Id. §§ 5/34-85(a), 5/10-22.4.
124. Id. § 5/24A-5(h).
125. Id. § 5/24A-5(i).
126. Id. §§ 5/24A-5(m), 5/24-16.5(b).
127. Id. § 5/24A-5(n).
128. Id. See also id. § 5/24A-5(i).
129. However, when a school district brings immediate dismissal proceedings against a
tenured teacher for deficiencies deemed irremediable, the dismissal process appears to give the
teacher an opportunity to correct deficiencies that in fact are remediable before those “causes”
become “charges” that form the basis of dismissal. See id. § 5/24-12(d)(1).
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are recalled. Categories of teachers with the worst performance
evaluation ratings must be laid off before those with the best ratings. 130
Additionally, when a school district fills any vacancies, performance
evaluation ratings must be considered, and length of service may not be
considered except as a tie breaker. 131 However, teachers are given a
role in shaping layoff and recall procedures, in part to prevent pretextual
dismissal of teachers with long terms of service. 132
B. Michigan
In Michigan, teachers must be evaluated at least once at the end of
each year. 133 Teachers can be rated “highly effective,” “effective,”
“minimally effective,” or “ineffective.” 134 By the 2015–2016 school
year, at least fifty percent of a teacher’s evaluation must be based on
student growth assessment data from the prior three years. 135
Michigan’s scheme expressly states that the purpose of its performance
evaluation system is to inform decisions about whether teachers are
effective, need professional development, should receive tenure, or
should be removed. 136
Every evaluation must include teacher
performance goals and recommended training, 137 and the scheme
includes measures to help teachers who receive low ratings. 138
As in other states, Michigan performance evaluation ratings influence
teachers’ employment status and job security. Probationary teachers’
ratings affect the length of their probationary period and whether they
will receive tenure status. 139 Tenured teachers may only be dismissed
for “a reason that is not arbitrary or capricious.” 140 Tenured teachers
who receive an ineffective rating must show progress toward personal
development goals during a 180-day period. 141 Although the statute
does not expressly state that failure to do so is sufficient cause for
dismissal, the scheme does not provide for any other adverse
consequence for failure to meet individual development goals. 142

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id. § 5/24-12(b).
Id. § 5/24-1.5.
Id. § 5/24-12(c).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 380.1249(2)(a) (West 2011).
Id. § 380.1249(1)(c).
Id.; id. § 380.1249(2)(a)(ii).
See id. § 380.1249(1)(d).
Id. § 380.1249(2)(a)(iii).
Id.
See id. § 38.83b(1)–(2).
Id. § 38.101(1).
Id. § 38.93.
See id. §§ 38.101, 380.1249(2)(h).
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Accordingly, a single “ineffective” rating and failure to attain individual
development goals would be grounds for dismissal. Further, a school
district must dismiss the teacher if he or she is rated “ineffective” for
three consecutive years. 143
C. Colorado
All public teachers in Colorado are evaluated against performance
standards established by the state board and adopted by the general
assembly. 144 At least fifty percent of a teacher’s rating must be
determined by the academic growth of the teacher’s students. 145 The
legislature identified five purposes for Colorado’s evaluation system:
(1) establishing a foundation to improve instruction, (2) improving
administration of curricula, (3) measuring and documenting teacher
performance for dismissal purposes, (4) measuring teacher professional
growth and development, and (5) measuring teacher effectiveness. 146
Similar to other states, a tenured teacher’s performance evaluation
rating can lead to dismissal. Tenured teachers may be dismissed only
for cause, which includes “unsatisfactory performance.” 147 If a tenured
teacher receives an “ineffective” rating, the teacher may be given a
remediation plan. 148 If the teacher’s next evaluation rating is
“ineffective,” then the evaluator may either suggest additional measures
to improve the teacher’s performance or recommend dismissal. 149
Colorado’s performance evaluation system also influences the
likelihood that a tenured teacher will be selected to teach at a given
school. Principals must consent to the assignment of a teacher to the
principal’s school. 150 If no principal consents to the placement of a
teacher at a school after the longer of twelve months or two “hiring
cycles,” then the school district must place the teacher on unpaid
leave. 151 However, tenured teachers on unpaid leave who received an
“effective” rating on their most recent evaluation are given priority to
interview for open teaching positions. 152

143. Id. § 380.1249(2)(h).
144. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-106(1) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of First Reg. Sess.
Gen. Assembly (2013)).
145. Id. § 22-9-106(1)(e)(II).
146. Id. § 22-9-106(1)(d)(I)–(V).
147. Id. § 22-63-301.
148. Id. § 22-9-106(4.5)(b).
149. Id.
150. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(I).
151. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV).
152. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(III)(A).
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D. Idaho
Idaho also requires annual evaluations for its public teachers. 153
Similar to Colorado and Michigan, fifty percent of the total evaluation
must be based on “objective measures of growth in student
achievement.” 154 Idaho’s statute is less specific than those in other
states, perhaps because it authorizes the state board to promulgate
procedures to implement the performance evaluation system. 155 Unlike
Michigan and Colorado, Idaho’s scheme does not expressly state the
purpose of performance evaluations.
The effect of Idaho’s scheme on public teachers’ interest in
employment depends on the teacher’s particular contract. Idaho school
districts may not enter into renewable contracts that lead to the “vesting
of tenure” or “continued expectations of employment or property rights
in an employment relationship.” 156 However, “renewable contract
status” is “grandfathered” for teachers who achieved that status prior to
January 31, 2011. 157 Although school districts must renew the contracts
of teachers with renewable contract status after each school year, 158 the
state board may put a teacher with renewable contract status on
probation for “unsatisfactory performance.” 159
If the teacher’s
performance remains unsatisfactory, the board may decide not to renew
the renewable contract. 160 Additionally, upon renewal the board may
reduce a teacher’s contract term or salary. 161 The board’s authority not
to renew renewable contracts on the basis of performance and to alter
their essential terms undermines traditional tenure protections.
Furthermore, Idaho school districts must employ teachers on
“Category A” or “Category B” contracts. 162 Category A contracts are
one-year contracts for teachers in the first three years of employment; 163
Category B contracts are two-year contracts that the board may offer to
teachers after three years of continuous employment with the same
district. 164 Though school districts need not renew Category A or B
153. See IDAHO CODE § 33-514(4) (2012), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/id
stat/Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session).
154. Id.
155. See id. § 33-514–33-515.
156. Id. § 33-515(1).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 33-515(2).
159. Id. § 33-515(5).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 33-515(7).
162. See id. § 33-514(2)(a)–(b).
163. Id. § 33-514(2)(a).
164. Id. § 33-514(2)(b).
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contracts, they must not make renewal decisions until completing
teachers’ annual performance evaluations. 165 While teachers with
Category B contracts may request “informal review” of a decision not to
renew their contract, 166 “no new employment contract between a school
district and a certificated employee shall result in the vesting of tenure,
continued expectations of employment or property rights in an
employment relationship.” 167
The Board also may dismiss teachers during a contract term for
conduct that is grounds for revoking a teaching certificate, which is
similar to conduct commonly enumerated in just-cause dismissal
provisions, such as gross negligence and incompetence. 168 This
dismissal power expressly applies to teachers with grandfathered
renewable contracts. 169 Therefore, poor performance ratings can be the
basis for dismissal of all teachers.
E. Florida
Florida teachers can receive ratings of “highly effective,” “effective,”
“needs improvement,” or “unsatisfactory.” 170 The purpose of the
system is to increase “student learning growth by improving the quality
of instructional . . . services in the public schools.” 171 To that end, at
least fifty percent of teacher evaluations must be based on student
learning growth as demonstrated by student test scores over the prior
three years. 172
Performance evaluation ratings greatly influence the hiring and
contract renewal of teachers in Florida. Florida’s scheme eschews
traditional tenure: all teachers who complete a probationary period
(other than some grandfathered teachers) receive one-year contracts that
district school boards may renew annually. 173 A district school board
may not offer or renew a one-year contract unless: (1) a teacher has
been recommended by the district superintendent and approved by the
district board based on the teacher’s performance evaluation; and (2) a
teacher has not received two consecutive annual performance ratings of
“unsatisfactory,” two annual ratings of “unsatisfactory” within the prior
three years, or three consecutive ratings of “needs improvement” or a
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. § 33-514(2)(a)–(b).
Id. § 33-514(2)(b).
Id. § 33-515(1).
Id. §§ 33-513(5), 33-1208(1)–(2).
Id. § 33-515(6).
FLORIDA STAT ANN. § 1012.34(2)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).
Id. § 1012.34(2)(1)(a).
Id. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1), 1012.34(3)(a)(1)(a).
Id. §§ 1012.33(3)–(4), 1012.335(2)(b)–(c).
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combination of “needs improvement” and “unsatisfactory.” 174
Moreover, a single “unsatisfactory” rating can result in nonrenewal if a
teacher does not correct his or her performance within ninety days. 175
Thus, performance ratings can preclude hiring and renewal of teachers.
A teacher’s performance rating also can lead to removal during a
contract term. All contracts must provide for just-cause dismissal,
which includes two consecutive ratings of “unsatisfactory,” two ratings
of “unsatisfactory” within a three-year period, or three consecutive
ratings of “needs improvement,” or a combination of “needs
improvement” and “unsatisfactory.” 176 Additionally, teachers with the
lowest performance ratings are laid off first during layoff periods. 177
Performance evaluation ratings play an influential, if not determining,
role in nearly every context in which a teacher could face an adverse
employment decision.
Florida’s scheme includes vague provisions that could permit
teachers to improve their skills and avoid removal for poor performance
ratings. By leaving the details to local school districts, this scheme
makes the effectiveness of any professional development difficult to
evaluate. The evaluation system must “provide appropriate instruments,
procedures and criteria for continuous quality improvement of the
professional skills of instructional personnel.” 178 Teachers with
“unsatisfactory” ratings must receive suggestions for improvement and
assistance to correct performance problems before an evaluator may
recommend dismissal. 179
Finally, teachers have some role in
determining performance standards: the education commissioner must
consult with experts and stakeholders, including teachers, about the
criteria used to determine performance levels. 180
F. Oklahoma
Oklahoma requires school districts to evaluate probationary teachers
biannually and tenured teachers annually. 181 The purpose of the
evaluation system is to “provide feedback to improve student learning
and outcomes.” 182 Teachers can receive the following ratings:
“superior,” “highly effective,” “effective,” “needs improvement,” or
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. §§ 1012.335(2)(b)–(c), 1012.33(3)(a)–(b).
Id. § 1012.34(4)(b)(2).
Id. § 1012.33(1)(a).
Id. § 1012.33(5).
Id. § 1012.34(2)(b).
Id. § 1012.34(4)(a), (b)(2).
Id. § 1012.34(2)(e).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-101.10(A)(4)–(5) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).
Id. § 6-101.16(B)(2).
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“ineffective.” 183 Thirty-five percent of each rating must be based on
quantitative data of student academic growth; fifteen percent must be
based on quantitative data of other academic measures; 184 and the other
half of each rating must be based on qualitative factors correlated to
student performance. 185
Probationary teachers’ ratings determine the length of the
probationary period preceding tenure status. 186 Additionally, if a
probationary teacher does not receive a minimum specified combination
of ratings over a four-year period, the teacher will not receive tenure
status unless a principal petitions the superintendent. 187 A probationary
teacher who does not receive tenure after four years or who receives two
consecutive “ineffective” ratings must be dismissed. 188
Tenured teachers—who can be dismissed only for enumerated
reasons, including “instructional ineffectiveness” 189—can be removed
based on performance ratings in two ways. First, tenured teachers must
be dismissed or must not have their contracts renewed after receiving
two consecutive “ineffective” ratings, three consecutive “needs
improvement” ratings or lower, or an average rating over a five-year
period of less than “effective.” 190 Second, administrators have
discretion to seek removal if they detect “poor performance or conduct
that the administrator believes may lead to a recommendation” for
dismissal or nonrenewal. 191
However, Oklahoma’s performance evaluation process includes some
features designed to help teachers achieve higher ratings and avoid
removal. Performance evaluations must include remediation plans and
“instructional coaching” for teachers who receive “needs improvement”
or “ineffective” ratings. 192 Additionally, school administrators must
make a “reasonable effort” to help teachers improve and must give the
teacher “reasonable time” (not to exceed two months) to make
improvements. 193 If a teacher fails to improve, then the administrator
must make a recommendation to dismiss the teacher. 194
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. § 6-101.16(B)(1).
Id. § 6-101.16(B)(4)(a).
Id. § 6-101.16(B)(4)(b), (B)(5).
See id. § 6-101.3(4)(b)(1)–(2).
Id. § 6-101.3(4)(b)(3).
Id. § 6-101.22(D)(1)–(2).
Id. § 6-101.22(A).
Id. § 6-101.22(C)(1)–(3).
Id.; § 6-101.24(C).
Id. § 6-101.16(B)(3).
Id. § 6-101.24(A).
Id.
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G. Statutory Features Relevant to Intended Benefit Factor
Certain characteristics of the state schemes described above are
particularly relevant to Part V’s intended benefit factor analysis. In all
states, teachers can only be removed for cause, not at will.
Additionally, most states offer teachers professional development
opportunities that, to varying extents, enhance teachers’ skills and
afford a measure of job security. Illinois gives teachers a role in
shaping the layoff and recall process. Colorado’s scheme permits de
facto dismissal of teachers by allowing principals to refuse teacher
assignments. Idaho teachers with grandfathered renewable contracts
have a diluted right to renewal of those contracts, yet the Idaho
legislature expressly stated its intent not to confer due process rights on
teachers. Most importantly, all states make student performance a
significant, if not primary, factor in teachers’ performance evaluation
ratings.
IV. ESTABLISHING, AND JUSTIFYING DEPARTURE FROM, THE BASELINE
Conner and Gonzales show that the Court is moving away from the
Roth/Perry approach, and demonstrate the Court’s parallel trend of
limiting public employees’ constitutional rights. This Part shows that
the Court could draw on Conner and Gonzales to develop a new
approach to evaluating public teachers’ interest in employment and
thereby limit their due process rights.
First, this Part examines how the Roth/Perry approach would apply to
the state performance-based public teacher employment schemes in
Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida, and Oklahoma. That
analysis provides a baseline to understand how the Court’s possible new
approach could shatter the prevailing understanding of tenured public
teachers’ due process rights. Next, this Part explores three rationales
derived from Conner and Gonzales that could justify abandoning the
Roth/Perry framework: (1) the Roth/Perry approach wastes judicial
resources and undermines proper deference to state and local officials;
(2) the discretion formulation encourages laws and regulations that do
not treat people uniformly and fairly; and (3) federal constitutional law,
not state law, should determine whether an interest is entitled to due
process protection.
A. The Baseline: Teachers’ Procedural Due Process Rights under
Roth/Perry
The Roth/Perry approach examines independent sources of authority,
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such as state law, to determine whether an individual has a legitimate
claim of entitlement to an interest. 195 If a court finds that a source of
authority constrains official discretion to deprive a person of an interest,
then the person is entitled to due process. 196 However, if a government
official has discretion to deprive a person of an interest, then the person
is not entitled to due process. 197
To apply the Roth/Perry approach to tenured teachers’ employment
interest under the statutory schemes in Illinois, Michigan, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, and Oklahoma, a court would identify any provisions
that could give rise to a legitimate claim of entitlement to employment
and determine whether officials have discretion to deprive tenured
public teachers of employment. The subsequent Subsections examine
just-cause dismissal provisions in all six states, as well as other
dismissal and renewal provisions in Idaho and Florida. Under the
Roth/Perry approach, tenured public teachers in all six states have a
protected interest in employment with respect to dismissal. Tenured
teachers in Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, and Oklahoma also have a
protected interest in contract renewal. Tenured teachers in Idaho only
have a weak protected interest in renewal, entitling them to less robust
process before dismissal. Florida public teachers have no interest in
renewal and no corresponding due process protection against contract
nonrenewal.
1. Just-Cause Dismissal Provisions
In Roth, a professor at a public college did not have a protected
property interest in employment because no independent source of
authority limited his dismissal or nonrenewal to just cause. 198 The
professor had no legitimate claim of entitlement to employment that
gave him a property interest in contract renewal because the professor’s
employment could be terminated at the college’s discretion. 199 By
contrast, in Perry, a teacher’s manual and policy guidelines suggested
that professors employed for a minimum number of years would not be
deprived of employment except for cause. 200 Accordingly, the
professor in Perry may have had a property interest in contract renewal.
Therefore, under the Roth/Perry analysis, if an independent source of
authority generally limits removal of a public teacher to just cause, the
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

See supra Part I.B–C.
See supra Part I.B–C.
See supra Part I.D.
Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 578 (1972).
Id.
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 600–01 (1972).
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teacher has a protected property interest in employment with regard to
dismissal and nonrenewal.
Statutory schemes in Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida,
and Oklahoma each limit dismissal of tenured teachers to just cause.
All of these provisions limit official discretion to terminate the
employment of tenured teachers absent certain grounds. 201
Accordingly, under the Roth/Perry approach, teachers in all six states
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to employment with respect to
dismissal within a contract term, and teachers in all states but Idaho and
Florida have an equivalent protected interest in contract renewal. To
that extent, the new statutory schemes do nothing to reduce tenured
teachers’ right to due process under the Roth/Perry approach. 202
2. Dismissal vs. Renewal: Idaho and Florida
The schemes in Idaho and Florida distinguish between a school
district’s authority to dismiss a teacher during a contract term and to not
renew a teacher’s contract upon expiration. Under the Roth/Perry
approach, teachers in Idaho have a lesser property interest in
employment with respect to contract renewal than dismissal, which in
turn entitles those teachers to less robust due process protection.
Teachers in Florida have no property interest in renewal, which gives
them no due process right to challenge nonrenewal of a contract.

201. Schemes that make performance ratings a possible basis for just-cause dismissal and
remove seniority as a criterion relevant to certain employment decisions may be perceived as
weakening the protection given to teachers, thereby reducing the extent to which those teachers
have a legitimate claim of entitlement to employment. As applied to teachers who have seniority
but who do not receive good performance evaluation ratings, performance-based schemes may
not assure secure employment, especially compared to regimes that favor senior teachers.
However, that is irrelevant to the Roth/Perry analysis of whether an independent source of
authority creates a protected interest in employment. The six schemes discussed in this Article
have just-cause dismissal provisions that conceptually are no different than the just-cause
dismissal provisions at issue in Roth and Perry: they limit official discretion to dismiss teachers.
Although many of the new schemes have added performance ratings as a basis for dismissal, they
still do not give officials greater discretion to dismiss teachers. In fact, adding performance as a
basis for dismissal may cabin official discretion more than the vague epithets often used to
describe “just cause,” such as “neglect of duty.” Accordingly, for the purpose of Roth/Perry
analysis, dismissal provisions that define “cause” to include “performance” constrain official
discretion to dismiss teachers and therefore give rise to a protected property interest in
employment.
202. However, in states such as Florida, where teachers must have one-year contracts that
district school boards have discretion to renew each year, procedural due process protection
triggered by dismissal during a contract term is less significant. A school district effectively can
remove a teacher without implicating procedural due process safeguards by waiting for a
teacher’s contract to expire and then opting not to renew it. See infra Part IV.A.2.ii. See also
infra Part IV.A.2.i (discussion of discretionary renewal in Idaho).
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i. Idaho
Although an Idaho school board may dismiss a teacher during a
contract term solely for cause, 203 it has discretion not to renew a teacher
working under a Category A or B contract, provided that no decision
about renewal may be made until after a teacher’s performance
evaluation is complete. 204 This condition implies that a school board
must take into account a teacher’s performance rating before making a
renewal decision. Otherwise, the provision conditioning contract
renewal decisions on the completion of a teacher’s performance
evaluation would be superfluous. Although the statute does not state
what performance ratings would prevent a school board from deciding
not to renew a teacher’s contract, 205 the implied constraint at minimum
must preclude a school board from not renewing the contract of a
teacher who received the highest possible rating. Therefore, Idaho’s
scheme impliedly constrains official discretion and creates some
property interest in employment relating to renewal of Category A and
B contracts, albeit a weaker interest than teachers’ interest in
employment for dismissal purposes. Accordingly, under the Roth/Perry
approach, teachers with Category A or B contracts whose contracts are
not renewed are entitled to an opportunity for a hearing. The extent of
that hearing, however, depends on balancing teachers’ interest in
employment against the government’s interest in administering the
schools. 206
The Idaho Code attempts to withhold any property interest in renewal
of Category A or B contracts, but that effort is ineffective under the
Roth/Perry approach. Under Idaho law, no property rights attach to
Category A and B contracts and employees have no right to formal
review of a board’s decision not to renew such contracts. 207 However,
in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that “‘[p]roperty’ cannot be defined by the procedures provided for
its deprivation.” 208 In Loudermill, a school board argued that the
statutory procedures governing termination of employment could
203. IDAHO CODE § 33-513(5) (2012), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/
Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session); id. § 33-1208(1)–(2).
204. Id. § 33-514(2)(a)–(b).
205. See id.
206. Here, the constraint on official discretion is implied and the scope of that constraint may
be narrow. Therefore, an individual teacher’s property interest in employment would be
relatively weak. By comparison, the government’s interest in effectively managing its school
system is strong. Accordingly, Idaho teachers probably would not be entitled to a robust predeprivation hearing in the contract nonrenewal context.
207. Id.
208. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
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narrow the scope of a school security guard’s property interest in
employment, which substantively only could be terminated for just
cause. 209 The Court rejected that reasoning because the Due Process
Clause’s protection of property “would be reduced to a mere tautology”
if “[t]he categories of substance and procedure are distinct.” 210 Once a
statute creates a substantive property interest in employment by limiting
dismissal to cause, then procedural provisions cannot limit the extent of
due process required by the Constitution. 211 Accordingly, Idaho’s
provision purporting to prohibit teachers from challenging nonrenewal
of a contract cannot deprive teachers of due process rights arising from
their substantive property interest in employment, which derives from
the implied constraint on official discretion not to renew Category A
and B contracts.
The Idaho Code also seeks to withhold a property interest by labeling
teachers’ interest in contract renewal as “not property.” 212 Some
scholars believe that state legislatures may label an interest as “not
property” for procedural due process purposes. 213 However, permitting
states to withhold a property interest in employment solely by resort to
labels is inconsistent with Loudermill’s command that the hallmark of
the Roth/Perry analysis is whether an independent source of authority
creates a substantive interest in employment by constraining official
discretion. 214 Furthermore, labeling an interest in contract renewal as
“not property” contradicts the Court’s pronouncement in Gonzales that
“although the underlying substantive interest is created by an
independent source, such as state law, federal constitutional law
determines whether the interest rises to the level of a legitimate claim of
entitlement protected by the Due Process Clause.” 215 Following this
209. Id. at 540.
210. Id. at 541.
211. Id.
212. See IDAHO CODE § 33-514(2)(a) (2012), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/id
stat/Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session) (“No property rights shall attach
to a category A contract . . . .”); id. § 33-514(2)(b) (“No property rights shall attach to a category
B contract . . . .”).
213. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative State, 72 CAL. L. REV.
1044, 1091–92 (1984) (“As Bishop v. Wood made clear, federal requirements could be negated if
state law were interpreted to have created no property rights. . . . Thus, as long as the Court
insists that due process protection requires a property interest and that state law is the only
standard for property, it is virtually committed to accepting the state’s control over the content of
due process protection.” (internal citation omitted)).
214. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541.
215. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Although this Article argues that Gonzales signals a shift away from
the Roth/Perry analysis and supplies a factor that could be used by the Court to introduce a new
mode of analysis for determining the presence of a protected property interest, Gonzales did not
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logic, Idaho cannot create a substantive property interest in contract
renewal and simultaneously declare that teachers have no property
interest in contract renewal without usurping the Court’s role to decide
whether the substantive interest is “property” entitled to due process
protection. 216
In contrast to teachers with Category A or B contracts, Idaho teachers
with grandfathered renewable contracts have a statutory “right” to
contract renewal, 217 which confers a more definite claim of entitlement
to employment for renewal purposes. However, Idaho’s statutory
scheme also gives a school board discretion to renew such contracts at
lower pay rates and for shorter terms. 218 As a result, any “right to
renewal” is of uncertain value, which undercuts the reliance interest of
teachers with renewable contract status. Thus, under the Roth/Perry
approach, while teachers on renewable contracts have some property
interest in employment for the purpose of contract renewal, the Idaho
Code reduces the intensity of that interest, which may reduce the
amount of process due upon nonrenewal.
ii. Florida
Florida’s scheme denies teachers any protected property interest in
employment for purposes of contract renewal. Teachers who have
completed a probationary period and meet certain criteria may be given
annual contracts. 219 Although a district school board must have just
cause to dismiss a teacher during an annual contract term, 220 it may
choose not to grant or renew annual contracts for any reason. 221
Accordingly, district school boards have discretion to deprive teachers
of employment through nonrenewal. 222 Thus, Florida teachers with
annual contracts have neither a property interest in contract renewal nor
a right to due process before nonrenewal.

overrule Roth or Perry and purported to apply the Roth/Perry analysis. Accordingly, any effort to
evaluate whether, under the Roth/Perry analysis, the Idaho Code creates a property interest in
employment with regard to the renewal of teacher contracts must not ignore the dicta in Gonzales.
216. See id.
217. IDAHO CODE § 33-515(2).
218. Id. § 33-515(3).
219. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.335(c)(2) (West 2011).
220. Id. § 1012.335(4).
221. Id. § 1012.335(1)(a).
222. Indeed, Florida’s scheme only limits local school boards’ discretion to renew, as opposed
to not renew, a teacher’s contract. A district school board may not renew an annual contract
unless the district superintendent supports the teacher’s candidacy and the teacher received
certain combinations of performance ratings over the course of the immediate prior two- or threeyear period. Id. §§ 1012.33(3)(a)–(b), 1012.335(2)(b)–(c).
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B. Justifying a Departure from Roth/Perry: Three Regrets (Rationales)
Under the Roth/Perry approach, tenured teachers in all six states
examined in this Article have a protected property interest in
employment with respect to dismissal. 223 Tenured teachers in five of
these states, excluding Idaho, also would have a protected interest in
employment with regard to contract renewal. 224 However, in Conner
and Gonzales the Court signaled an inclination to depart from the
Roth/Perry analysis; 225 the Court sounded similar themes in the course
of restricting public employees’ speech and equal protection rights in
Ceballos and Engquist, respectively. 226 Conner and Gonzales offer
three rationales that the Court could use to discard the Roth/Perry
analysis in the context of public teachers’ due process claims.
1. Roth/Perry Is Not Properly Deferential to State and Local Officials
In Conner, the Court discarded an analysis similar to the Roth/Perry
approach and reverted to its prior method of determining the presence of
a protected interest in the prisoner/liberty context: whether a regulation
causing deprivation of that interest imposed an “atypical and significant
hardship” on the regulated person. 227 In part, the Court was concerned
that scrutiny of prison regulations for any constraints on official
discretion did not show “appropriate deference to state officials trying
to manage a volatile environment.” 228 The Gonzales Court showed a
similar concern when it deferred to police officers’ historic enforcement
discretion, notwithstanding statutory constraints on officers’ discretion
to make enforcement decisions. 229
The Court’s reasoning in Conner can be exported from the
prisoner/liberty context. The purpose behind the official discretion
analysis in the liberty and property contexts is similar: to protect
reliance on an interest subject to deprivation by the government. 230
Moreover, the Court’s reluctance in Conner to second-guess prison
officials in the liberty context is equally applicable to government
employers in the property context. The discretion formulation requires
courts to stand in the shoes of government employers to determine
whether their actions were subject to, and complied with, any
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See supra Part III.A–F.
See supra Part IV.A.2.i (discussing discretionary renewal in Idaho).
See supra Part II.A.1–2.
See supra Part II.B.1–2.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995).
Id. at 482.
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–58 (2005).
Conner, 515 U.S. at 497–98.
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constraints on discretion. Accordingly, applying the Roth/Perry
approach in the public employment context shows little deference to
state and local officials who, like the prison officials in Conner, are
responsible for managing large facilities serving many people, often
under difficult circumstances. Considering also the Court’s deference
to government employers in Ceballos and Engquist, concern about
deference could be a contributing factor that persuades the Court to
replace the Roth/Perry analysis with another method for determining the
presence of a protected interest in the property/public employment
context.
2. Roth/Perry Encourages Regulations that Treat People Unequally
and Unfairly
In Conner, the Court expressed a second qualm with the Roth/Perry
approach that also could be invoked in the public employment context:
it creates a perverse incentive to vest excessive discretion in state and
local officials who might use that discretion to treat regulated persons
unfairly. 231 In part because of this possible influence on regulations
defining the authority of prison officials, the Court stopped using the
discretion formulation in the prisoner/liberty context and reverted to the
atypical and significant hardship framework. 232
The Court’s rationale in Conner also can be used to justify discarding
the Roth/Perry approach in the employment of public teachers. As
discussed, Conner need not be limited to the prisoner/liberty context. 233
Moreover, although the Court in Conner cited no evidence that state
prison officials in fact received excessive discretion due to the Court’s
use of the discretion formulation, 234 some state public teacher
employment schemes contain evidence that the Roth/Perry approach
actually influenced legislative decisions about how: (1) to regulate
public teachers’ employment generally; and (2) to grant education
officials discretion to impede public teachers’ due process rights in
employment. Therefore, the perverse influence of the discretion
formulation could prompt the Court to replace the Roth/Perry approach
with the atypical and significant hardship standard in the public teacher
employment context, just as it did in the prison/liberty context.
i. Evidence of Roth/Perry’s General Influence on State Legislatures
The Roth/Perry approach likely influenced schemes governing
231.
232.
233.
234.

Conner, 515 U.S. at 482.
Id. at 482–84.
See supra Part II.A.1 (summarizing Conner).
See id. at 482.
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teacher employment in Oklahoma, Idaho, and Colorado. For instance,
the Oklahoma legislature believed that the Roth/Perry approach
required the state to provide due process to “career teachers” before
termination. 235 One provision states that teachers “shall be entitled to
all rights guaranteed under the circumstances by the United States
Constitution.” 236
Another provision defines “career teacher
pretermination hearing” in part as an opportunity “to ensure that the
career teacher is afforded the essential pretermination due process
requirements of notice and an opportunity to respond.” 237 Although the
Oklahoma legislature did not respond to the Roth/Perry approach by
expanding official discretion over teachers’ employment, the
Roth/Perry approach clearly influenced the provision requiring due
process for “career teachers” who have a legitimate claim of entitlement
to employment.
Additionally, the Colorado legislature wished to limit the number of
teachers who could claim due process rights in employment under the
Roth/Perry approach.
A requirement that school districts give
probationary teachers the reasons for contract nonrenewal does “not
create any property right or contract right, express or implied.” 238 The
Colorado legislature apparently worried that providing reasons for
nonrenewal could be construed as a constraint on official discretion not
to renew a contract, thereby creating a protected property interest in
employment.
The Idaho Code demonstrates even greater trepidation that teachers
could be entitled to procedural due process under the Roth/Perry
approach. Idaho’s scheme expressly attempts to disclaim that Category
A and B teachers have no property interest in employment and therefore
have no due process rights. 239 Idaho legislators sought to preclude
application of the Roth/Perry approach and thereby reduce the number
of due process claims. 240
235. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 70, § 6-101.3(6) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.) (effective July
1, 2012); id. § 70-6-101.26(A).
236. Id. at § 70-6-101.26(A) (emphasis added).
237. Id. at § 6-101.3(6) (emphasis added).
238. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-203(4)(b)(II) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of First
Reg. Sess. Gen. Assembly (2013)). However, such statements disclaiming no property right are
inconsistent with the Court’s pronouncement in Gonzales that federal constitutional law
determines whether a substantive interest created by state law merits procedural due process
protection. See supra Part II.A.2.
239. IDAHO CODE §§ 33-514(2)(a)–(b), 33-515(1) (2012), available at http://www.legislature.
idaho.gov/idstat/Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session).
240. As discussed, under the Roth/Perry approach, Idaho legislators may not have been
successful in their effort to limit teachers’ property interest in employment and corresponding
procedural due process rights. However, as will be discussed, if the Court were to apply the
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ii. Evidence that Roth/Perry Induced Legislators to Grant Official
Discretion
The Roth/Perry analysis also may have induced the Colorado
legislature to expand official discretion over decisions that have an
effect equivalent to dismissal. Principals have discretion to reject
teachers nominated to fill vacant positions. 241 After the longer of
twelve months or two “hiring cycles,” school districts must place
teachers who are rejected on unpaid leave. 242 The practical result of a
principal’s discretion to reject placement of a teacher can be similar to
dismissal. 243
Because a principal’s rejection of a teacher does not necessarily
deprive that teacher of employment, 244 rejection may not trigger a due
process issue. However, if rejection leads to unpaid leave and
effectively deprives a teacher of employment, the teacher does not have
a protected property interest in school placement because principals
have discretion to reject teacher placements. Consistent with the
Court’s concern in Conner, nothing prevents a principal from exercising
this discretion unfairly. The Court could conclude that the Roth/Perry
approach encouraged granting excessive discretion to Colorado
principals to avoid creating due process rights. To remove that perverse
incentive, the Court could decide to replace the Roth/Perry approach
with Conner’s atypical and significant hardship standard.
Similarly, the Court could find that the Roth/Perry approach caused
Idaho legislators to provide local officials with excessive discretion to
avoid creating due process rights. Teachers with grandfathered
renewable contracts have a right to contract renewal, 245 but school
district boards have discretion to reduce the salary and duration of a
renewed contract. 246 Although reducing the salary or term of a contract
is not necessarily equivalent to nonrenewal, such actions deprive
teachers of economic value. Moreover, significant reduction in salary
could force a teacher not to accept a renewal offer, effectively giving
the board discretion to remove teachers. Because the board has
discretion to reduce salaries, teachers could not claim a protected

intended benefit factor to determine the presence of a protected property interest in employment,
teachers in all states examined in this Article other than Illinois would not be entitled to
procedural due process protection of employment. See infra Part V.
241. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(I).
242. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV).
243. See id.
244. See id. §§ 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(III)(A), 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV).
245. IDAHO CODE § 33-515(2).
246. Id. § 33-515(3).
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property interest in compensation. Accordingly, the Court could find
that the Roth/Perry approach induced the Idaho legislature to grant
excessive official discretion over renewal decisions for the purpose of
preventing teachers from having due process rights. For that reason, the
Court could set aside the Roth/Perry analysis.
In sum, the Court’s primary concern in Conner—that a focus on
official discretion created a perverse incentive to give state and local
officials excessive discretion for the purpose of avoiding the creation of
due process rights—is at least as valid in the public teacher employment
context as it is in the prison context. The Court reasonably could find
that it should abandon the Roth/Perry approach to eliminate that
incentive.
3. Roth/Perry Undercuts the Primacy of Federal Constitutional Law
In Gonzales, the Court justified its holding that state law did not
create a protected property interest in enforcement of a restraining order
in part by announcing that federal constitutional law, not state law,
determines whether the Due Process Clause protects a property
interest. 247 That novel idea is inconsistent with Roth and Perry, which
held that state law creates substantive property interests protected by
procedural due process. 248
The Court could use the primacy of federal constitutional law as
another reason to replace the Roth/Perry approach with the atypical and
significant hardship standard. Gonzales presented an atypical fact
pattern, but the Court did not limit its decision to the facts at issue. 249
Moreover, Gonzales showed discomfort with a broad conception of
property that suggests unease with the Roth/Perry approach
generally. 250 Therefore, the principle that the Constitution determines
whether an interest created by state law is protected by due process
could be invoked by the Court to discard the Roth/Perry approach in the
public employment context.
The Gonzales rationale also positions the Court to apply the atypical
and significant hardship framework. If federal constitutional law
decides whether an interest created by state law is protected, then the
question of whether a person has a legitimate claim of entitlement under
the Roth/Perry approach is irrelevant. 251 The Court would need a way
247. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005).
248. Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). See also
Hugenberger, supra note 76, at 801.
249. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 756–57.
250. See Hugenberger, supra note 76, at 800–01.
251. The Court in Gonzales avoided the claimant’s legitimate claim of entitlement to police
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to decide whether federal constitutional law recognizes due process
protection, 252 and the atypical and significant hardship framework could
furnish that method.
V. A NEW APPROACH AND A NEW REALITY: SHATTERING ASSUMPTIONS
ABOUT TEACHERS’ DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
Conner suggested an analytic framework that could replace the
Roth/Perry approach in cases involving property interests under the Due
Process Clause: whether an independent source of authority that
deprives a regulated party of a property interest imposes an atypical and
significant hardship on that party. 253 Additionally, Conner and
Gonzales suggested two factors—the intended benefit factor and
incidental benefit factor, respectively—that could be used to implement
the atypical and significant hardship framework. 254 The Court could
use these factors to assert the primacy of federal constitutional law in
determining the presence of a protected property interest in tenured
teacher employment.
Although the incidental benefit factor is inconsistent with the Court’s
procedural due process tradition in the public employment setting, if the
Court applied the intended benefit factor to the circumstances of
teachers working under performance-based employment schemes in
Illinois, Michigan, Colorado, Idaho, Florida, and Oklahoma, tenured
public teachers in these states would not have a protected property
interest in employment.
A. An Alternative to Roth/Perry: “Atypical and Significant Hardship”
In Conner, the Court abandoned an analysis similar to the Roth/Perry
approach in the prisoner/liberty context and instead focused on whether
a regulation “impose[d] atypical and significant hardship . . . in relation
to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” 255
Conner’s framework may be used when a party claims a protected
property interest. Admittedly, prison regulations differ from statutes
governing public teachers’ employment. Prison regulations impair
protection by declaring that state law did not actually require police officers to enforce restraining
orders, notwithstanding the plain language of the statute. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 765–66.
252. Perhaps sensing that need, the Court used two novel factors in Gonzales: (1) a protected
property interest must have a monetary value; and (2) a protected property interest must not be
incidental to the provision of a traditional government service. Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 766–67.
However, neither of those factors is relevant to the Court’s possible new approach in the public
teacher employment setting.
253. See supra Part II.A.1.
254. For a discussion of these factors, see infra Part V.B.1–2.
255. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995).
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prisoners’ actual liberty, which the Due Process Clause expressly
protects. By contrast, employment statutes implicate the Due Process
Clause less directly because public employment only sometimes is
“property.” Roth synthesized the Court’s prior holdings and fashioned
a mode of analysis to determine when an interest in public employment
was “property,” but the idea that due process sometimes should protect
public employment was not novel. 256
Thus, Conner’s atypical and significant hardship framework is a
possible alternative to the Roth/Perry approach in the property/public
employment context. The atypical and significant hardship framework
recognizes a protected liberty interest when a regulation excessively
burdens an individual’s liberty interest with respect to the totality of the
circumstances. Similarly, the Court could inquire whether a state
statute authorizing removal of tenured public teachers burdens teachers’
interest in employment so excessively in the totality of circumstances
that it triggers due process protection.
Application of this framework would rely on subjective judgments.
From a teacher’s perspective, a statute that provides for dismissal or
nonrenewal on the basis of performance evaluation ratings—founded
substantially on student test scores influenced in part by factors beyond
the teacher’s control—could impose an atypical and significant hardship
on the teacher’s employment interest. That is to say, the most dedicated
and well-prepared teachers could have difficulty improving student test
scores. Accordingly, making those scores a significant factor in job
security could impose an excessive burden. Conversely, school
256. Even before Roth the Court recognized that public employment could be “property” for
due process purposes, especially when dismissal was “arbitrary.” See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of
State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576–77 (1972) (citing Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S.
551, 559 (1955)) (holding that although a tenured professor at a public college may not have a
constitutional right to his job, his discharge for invoking his Fifth Amendment right not to
incriminate himself in response to questions about his affiliation with the Communist Party,
without inquiry into professor’s fitness as employee, violated the Due Process Clause’s protection
against “arbitrary action”); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952) (holding that
dismissal of public employees for failure to take a loyalty oath was an “assertion of arbitrary
power” that violated the Due Process Clause because the oath did not distinguish between
innocent and knowing association with organizations on Attorney General’s list)). Although
Slochower and Wieman could be viewed as anomalous attempts by the Court to protect
employees from becoming victims of the “red scare,” both decisions recognized that public
employees had an interest in employment sufficient to protect them from “arbitrary” dismissal.
Wieman, 344 U.S. at 191; Slochower, 350 U.S. at 559. Moreover, Roth broadened application of
those cases to public employment generally by recognizing the principle that public employees
have an interest that “proscrib[es] summary dismissal from public employment without hearing or
inquiry required by due process.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 577 (quoting Connell v. Higginbotham, 403
U.S. 207, 208 (1970)). Ironically, those early cases’ protection of public employees from
arbitrary adverse decisions greatly resembles the class-of-one claim in Engquist, which the Court
held was incompatible with the public employment setting. See id. at 576–77.
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administrators might believe that the state’s interest in improving
student outcomes and reducing administrative costs justifies using
student test scores to evaluate teachers. Additionally, they could show
that in most settings, employment is at will, and employers evaluate
employees according to standards developed solely by employers. By
contrast, under all of the statutory schemes discussed in this Article,
public teachers retain some job security and, under most of those
schemes, teachers have a degree of input during the performance
evaluation process. From this perspective, linking public teachers’
employment to performance evaluation ratings does not impose atypical
and significant hardship.
Balancing the subjective perspectives of teachers and education
officials in a fair and principled manner is an inherent difficulty of the
atypical and significant hardship framework. To mitigate this problem,
the Court could use the incidental benefit and intended benefit factors to
focus on specific facts relevant to whether regulations permitting
removal based on performance are excessively burdensome. These
factors also would allow the Court to eliminate the Roth/Perry
approach’s perverse incentives, show greater deference to state and
local officials, and assert the primacy of federal constitutional law.
B. Implementation: The Incidental Benefit and Intended Benefit
Factors
The incidental benefit and intended benefit factors are two possible
ways to implement the atypical and significant hardship framework.
The incidental benefit factor is inconsistent with the Court’s due process
tradition in the public employment context and therefore is not
applicable to public teachers’ due process rights in employment. The
intended benefit factor, however, is a viable method to determine the
presence of a protected property interest in the public employment
setting. If the Court adopted the intended benefit factor, tenured public
teachers in all states would not have a protected property interest in, or a
right to due process before removal from, employment.
1. Overview: Incidental Benefit Factor
In Gonzales, the Court stated that an individual’s governmentprovided interest is not protected if it is merely incidental to the
provision of traditional government services. 257 The Court held that a
woman did not have a property interest in enforcement of a restraining
order in part because any benefit from enforcement was merely
257. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766–67 (2005).
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incidental to the government’s provision of police services. 258
Accordingly, the woman could not claim a due process violation when
the police did not enforce the restraining order, even though a statute
appeared to mandate enforcement and the woman did not receive an
opportunity for a hearing. 259
The Court could derive the incidental benefit factor in the public
employment context from its analysis in Gonzales, which would
examine whether an interest created by a source of authority is merely
incidental to the provision of a traditional government service. By
definition, deprivation of an interest that arises as a mere incident to the
government’s provision of a traditional service does not impose an
excessive burden. “Incident” means “something dependent upon,
appertaining to or subordinate to, or accompanying something of
greater or principal importance, something arising or resulting from
something else of greater or principal importance.” 260 Similarly,
“incidental” means “depending upon or appertaining to something else
as primary; something necessary, appertaining to, or depending upon
another which is termed the principal; something incidental to the main
purpose.” 261 Therefore, an incidental benefit arising from the provision
of a traditional government service is secondary to, and of lesser
importance than, that service.
Although an incidental benefit may itself be important (the plaintiff
in Gonzales no doubt valued enforcement of the restraining order), it
never can be more important than the principal government service. For
that reason, the public’s interest in a government service must have
priority over an individual’s interest in an incidental benefit. Therefore,
deprivation of an incidental benefit cannot impose an atypical and
significant hardship on an individual for due process purposes. This
logic could help explain the harsh result in Gonzales. The public
interest in vesting enforcement discretion in police officers outweighs
an individual’s incidental interest in enforcement. Therefore, in light of
the totality of the circumstances, the police department’s failure to
enforce the restraining order did not impose an excessive burden on the
plaintiff for due process purposes, even though the woman endured
severe personal hardship. Accordingly, the woman’s interest in
enforcement was not protected by procedural due process.
The incidental benefit factor addresses many of the concerns the

258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. at 767.
Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 762 (6th ed. 1994) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
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Court expressed in Conner about the Roth/Perry analysis. 262 First, the
incidental benefit factor would be less likely than the Roth/Perry
approach to protect an interest when state officials did not primarily
intend to confer a benefit on a regulated party because barring
protection of incidental benefits would preclude protection of many
unintended benefits. Second, the incidental benefit factor would not
require close scrutiny of independent sources of authority, thereby
conserving judicial resources and showing greater deference to state and
local officials. Third, because the incidental benefit factor does not
focus on official discretion, it would not encourage rules that give
excessive discretion to administrators. Finally, the incidental benefit
factor would facilitate the Court’s exercise of constitutional judgment as
to whether an interest is entitled to procedural due process protection by
providing a standard to determine whether a source of authority imposes
an atypical and significant hardship.
Because the incidental benefit factor responds to the Court’s
criticisms of the Roth/Perry approach, it could be a way to determine
whether a property interest is protected by due process.
2. Overview: Intended Benefit Factor
The intended benefit factor derives from Conner. 263 In Conner, a
prison regulation did not create a liberty interest in protection from
solitary confinement in part because the “regulation [was] primarily
designed to guide correctional officials in the administration of a prison
[and was] not designed to confer rights on inmates.” 264 Thus, an
important factor in the Court’s conclusion that the prisoner did not have
a liberty interest was that state officials did not primarily intend to
benefit prisoners by requiring a finding of guilt based on substantial
evidence in disciplinary hearings. 265 The intended benefit factor would
inquire whether officials who crafted a source of authority primarily
intended to confer a right or benefit on a regulated individual or class of
people. If so, then the Due Process Clause would protect the regulated
parties’ interest; if not, then the regulated parties would not be entitled
to due process before government deprivation of that interest.
Although the Conner Court did not articulate a relationship between
official intent and the atypical and significant hardship standard, one
can infer such a connection. On the one hand, if state officials in
Conner had primarily intended to benefit prisoners by protecting them
262.
263.
264.
265.

See supra Part IV.B.
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995).
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
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from solitary confinement, then “in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life,” deprivation of that protection would be an atypical and
significant hardship. On the other hand, if (as the Court found) state
officials primarily intended the regulation to guide prison
administration, then solitary confinement is consistent with the
experience of prison life and consequently not an excessive burden.
Therefore, determining whether officials primarily intended to confer a
benefit on a person claiming a protected interest could be a factor used
to decide whether deprivation of that interest imposes an atypical and
significant hardship.
The intended benefit factor effectively responds to the Court’s
concerns about the Roth/Perry approach. First, by definition, the
intended benefit factor would not require due process when officials did
not intend to confer a benefit on an individual. Second, the intended
benefit factor would show greater deference to state officials by
enforcing their intent. Third, focusing on official intent instead of
discretion would not create a perverse incentive to give state and local
officials excessive discretion. 266 Rather, the intended benefit factor
would encourage officials to express their intent when crafting statutes
or regulations, which in turn would give all parties notice of the
presence or absence of a protected interest. Such notice would reduce
uncertainty and disputes about constitutional protection. Finally, the
intended benefit factor is a way to channel the Court’s prerogative to
determine whether federal constitutional law protects an interest.
Therefore, the Court could consider whether states primarily intended
to confer a benefit on public teachers by linking teachers’ employment
to performance measures based largely on student achievement.
C. Application of Intended Benefit and Incidental Benefit Factors
This Section applies the incidental benefit and intended benefit
factors to the six state schemes examined in this Article. While the
incidental benefit factor is inconsistent with the Court’s due process
266. One could argue that a focus on intent merely would shift discretion and the potential for
unfair decisions from local officials to judges. Admittedly, judicial inquiries into legislative
intent are not purely objective and can be manipulated. However, courts have institutional
experience construing a drafter’s intent in statutes and other documents. Settled principles of
interpretation guide courts’ analysis. Without maligning local officials or exaggerating judges’
virtue, it is fair to say that judges are more likely to exercise discretion responsibly. Additionally,
local officials’ discretion over regulated parties is different than judicial discretion to interpret
legislative intent because legislatures are in a better position than regulated parties to protect
themselves from abusive or erroneous exercise of discretion. If the Court began to apply the
intended benefit factor, legislatures could enact statutory schemes with substantive terms that
clearly define intended beneficiaries.
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tradition in the public employment setting, application of the intended
benefit factor would deny tenured public teachers of a protected
property interest in employment.
1. Incidental Benefit Factor: Inconsistent with Due Process Tradition
The Court could use the incidental benefit factor to determine
whether an independent source of authority imposes an atypical and
significant hardship on public teachers’ interest in employment. In
Gonzales, the Court found no protected property interest in enforcement
of a restraining order because such enforcement is merely incidental to
the provision of a traditional government service. 267 Like policing,
public education is a traditional government service, and like
enforcement of a restraining order, the employment of teachers is
merely incidental to educating children. Based on the Court’s reasoning
in Gonzales, public teachers’ interest in employment is not protected by
due process.
However, the incidental benefit factor would preclude nearly all
public employees who perform functions “that government actors have
always performed” 268 from claiming a protected property interest in
employment, which is inconsistent with the Court’s due process
tradition in the public employment context. The incidental benefit
factor is tantamount to a categorical rule against due process protection
of public employment, but the Court never has categorically denied
public employees such protection. Moreover, the incidental benefit
factor reflects a balancing of the government’s interest and the
individual’s interest, which also is inconsistent with the Court’s due
process tradition in the public employment context. Unlike the Court’s
First Amendment tradition governing public employees, 269 the Court’s
procedural due process tradition has not relied on balancing. Rather, the
Court has attempted to define the nature of an interest and its value to
the person seeking protection, including by examining whether an
interest is a right or a privilege, 270 is something to which a person has a
legitimate claim of entitlement, 271 or is something that, if deprived,
would impose on a person an atypical and significant hardship. 272
Although the incidental benefit factor may appear to characterize the
relative value of an interest by deeming it “incidental,” or secondary, by
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 766–68 (2005).
Id. at 766–67.
See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 13–16 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B–C (summarizing Roth and Perry).
See supra notes 67–71 (explaining Conner’s atypical and significant hardship test).
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reference to a traditional government service, in effect the incidental
benefit factor categorically would preclude due process protection of
public employment without attempting to evaluate the nature and
importance of the interest itself. Accordingly, the incidental benefit
factor is inconsistent with the Court’s due process tradition in the public
employment context and is not a viable method to implement the
atypical and significant hardship framework in the context of public
teachers’ employment.
2. Intended Benefit Factor: The Demise of Teachers’
Due Process Rights
Rather than adopting the incidental benefit factor analysis, the Court
could apply Conner’s intended benefit factor in the public employment
context.
To determine whether statutory performance-based
employment schemes impose an atypical and significant hardship on
tenured public teachers’ interest in employment, the Court would
determine whether the legislature primarily intended to confer a benefit
on teachers. 273 If the Court were to focus on individual statutory
provisions, such as those limiting the grounds for dismissal of tenured
teachers in all six states examined herein, it could find a primary intent
to benefit tenured teachers. However, application of the intended
benefit factor to a single provision is inconsistent with the atypical and
significant hardship framework, which is based on the totality of the
circumstances. 274
Any examination of legislative intent should
encompass the entire statutory scheme. 275 Accordingly, the following
Subsections evaluate whether each state’s laws demonstrate that the
legislature primarily intended to benefit tenured public teachers.
In sum, all of the schemes examined in this Article show that the
legislature primarily intended to benefit students, not teachers. This
conclusion is rooted in a common feature of those schemes: teacher
273. This analysis focuses on statutory evidence of primary intent to confer a benefit or right
on public teachers. A court could examine other sources to infer intent to confer a benefit on
teachers, such as regulations promulgated pursuant to authorizing legislation. At the time this
Article was researched and drafted, regulations to implement state statutory schemes were in
varying stages of development. Moreover, within a state, regulations could differ among school
districts. Therefore, for illustrative purposes, a statutory analysis permits the most comprehensive
and expedient comparative analysis of application of the intended benefit factor.
274. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484–87 (1995).
275. For example, in Conner, the Court decided that a prison regulation did not give rise to a
procedural due process right after evaluating the conditions imposed on a prisoner as a result of
the totality of applicable rules and regulations. Id. at 485–87. The Court found that the
regulation did not impose an atypical and significant hardship because, in the context of
applicable prison regulations, the hardship imposed by the regulation at issue was not so severe as
to deprive the prisoner of liberty for due process purposes. Id.

1_CAMILLUCCI

2013]

3/9/2013 1:31 PM

Regretting Roth

637

performance evaluations that are based in large part on the learning
growth or achievement of students. Although some state provisions
benefit teachers by providing professional development opportunities
intended to improve teachers’ skills and enhance job security, these
benefits are not ends in themselves. Rather, they are means to achieve
the primary purpose of benefitting students by improving student
performance. Because none of the schemes primarily intend to benefit
tenured teachers, dismissal of public teachers based on performance
evaluations would not impose an atypical and significant hardship on
those teachers, and they would not have a property interest in
employment protected by due process.
i. Illinois
Of the six states examined in this Article, the primary intent of
Illinois’ scheme is the most ambiguous. Beyond Illinois’ just-cause
dismissal provision, 276 several provisions suggest the legislature’s intent
to benefit teachers. Illinois provides relatively robust professional
development opportunities to teachers who receive poor performance
evaluation ratings. A teacher who receives a “needs improvement”
rating must receive a professional development plan within thirty
days. 277 Similarly, a teacher who receives an “unsatisfactory” rating
must be given a remediation plan within thirty days if the evaluator
deems the teacher’s deficiencies remediable. 278
Professional
development and remediation plans give teachers a blueprint to improve
their skills 279 and also can protect teachers from removal based on an
“unsatisfactory”
rating. 280
Those
professional
development
opportunities clearly are intended to benefit teachers.
Unlike most other states, the Illinois legislature also sought to protect
teachers by giving them a role in the layoff and recall process. Every
school district must create a committee of school board members and
teachers to oversee layoff and recall procedures and to assure that
teachers with seniority are not targeted unfairly for layoffs. 281 The
committee has the power to adjust the groupings of teachers used to
determine the order of layoffs and recalls. 282 Therefore, although layoff
and recall priorities are determined largely by performance evaluation

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

See 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/34-85(a), 10-22.4 (West 2012).
Id. § 5/24A-5(h).
Id. § 5/24A-5(i).
See id. § 5/24A-5(h)–(i).
See id. § 5/24A-5(m).
Id. § 5/24-12(c).
Id.
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ratings, 283 the Illinois legislature also intended to protect teachers from
pretextual layoffs. 284
These intended benefits to teachers, however, are offset by the
composition of teachers’ performance evaluation ratings, which shows
that the Illinois legislature designed its scheme primarily to benefit
students. The Illinois scheme requires that measures of student growth
be a “significant factor in the rating of a teacher’s performance.” 285
Mandating that student growth be a significant factor in teachers’
evaluations reframes the scheme’s professional development
opportunities as a means to accomplish an end other than enhancing
teachers’ skills and protecting teachers from removal: improving
student outcomes. In context, professional development is valuable
only to the extent that it benefits students by improving student test
scores.
Still, as compared to other states, Illinois’ regime is favorable to
teachers. Other states require that at least fifty percent of teachers’
evaluations be based on student growth or performance. By contrast,
“significant factor” is a vague term that permits Illinois school districts
to decide how much weight to give to student growth, which does not
preclude making student growth less than fifty percent of a teacher’s
evaluation.
A performance evaluation scheme that provides
professional development opportunities and gives majority weight to
factors other than student performance—such as qualitative assessments
of teachers’ preparation, classroom management, and pedagogy—could
be construed as demonstrating a primary intent to benefit teachers. Yet,
in the totality of the circumstances, making student outcomes a
“significant factor” in teachers’ performance evaluations is sufficient to
show that the primary purpose of the evaluation scheme is to benefit
students, and that any benefit to teachers is merely a means to that end.
Furthermore, school officials may dismiss teachers on the basis of
performance without developing a remediation plan when a teacher has
irremediable deficiencies. 286 Evaluators decide whether deficiencies
are “irremediable” and therefore have the power to remove teachers
with poor performance ratings without providing a remediation plan. 287
That power erodes the professional development and job security
benefit of remediation plans and shows that the legislature intended to
give evaluators the power to accomplish the primary goal of improving
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. § 5/24 12(b).
See id. § 5/24-12(c).
Id. § 5/24A-5(c).
Id. § 5/24A-5(n).
See id.
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student growth without the unintended consequence of protecting
teachers with irremediable deficiencies.
Making student test scores a significant factor in teacher evaluations
is part of an effort to hold teachers accountable for objective educational
outputs, not merely the quality of inputs. Students, not teachers, are the
primary intended beneficiaries of the Illinois scheme. Therefore,
removing tenured teachers on the basis of performance pursuant to that
scheme would not impose an atypical and significant hardship on
teachers that would trigger due process protection of employment.
ii. Michigan
Although Michigan’s scheme includes several provisions that benefit
teachers, the totality of the circumstances shows that the Michigan
legislature primarily intended to benefit students, such that removal of
teachers based upon performance evaluation ratings would not impose
an atypical and significant hardship.
Some provisions protect teachers from removal and provide
opportunities for teachers to improve their skills. Similar to just-cause
dismissal provisions in other states, Michigan prohibits arbitrary and
capricious dismissal of teachers, 288 which offers relative job security
compared to at-will employment. Additionally, Michigan provides
teachers with robust professional development opportunities to enhance
their skills and protect them from adverse employment decisions. 289
Indeed, Michigan’s scheme aims to assure that teachers “are given
ample opportunities for improvement.” 290 Evaluations should be used
to retain and cultivate teachers, including by “providing relevant
coaching, instruction support, or professional development.” 291
Although evaluations also should be used to remove ineffective tenured
teachers, such removal should occur only after teachers “have had
ample opportunities to improve.” 292
Accordingly, evaluations should provide “timely and constructive
feedback.” 293 To this end, annual year-end evaluations must include
specific performance goals, developed in consultation with teachers,
designed to improve effectiveness. 294
Evaluations also must

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 38.101 (West 2011).
Id. § 380.1249(1)(a)–(d).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 380.1249(2)(a)(iii).
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recommend training. 295 Teachers who receive “minimally effective” or
“ineffective” ratings must receive an “individualized development
plan,” also developed with the teacher. 296 Such teachers also must
receive a mid-year evaluation based on that plan which sets
performance goals for the remainder of the school year, recommends
additional training, and results in a written improvement plan “to assist
the teacher to improve his or her rating.” 297 Michigan further
encourages school districts to provide mentors or coaches to teachers
who receive “ineffective” or “minimally effective” ratings. 298
Collectively, these provisions show the strongest commitment of any
state examined in this Article to helping teachers develop professionally
and avoid dismissal on the basis of performance, which weighs strongly
in favor of finding that the Michigan legislature intended to benefit
teachers.
However, Michigan makes student achievement the predominant
basis for teachers’ performance ratings, which shows that Michigan’s
commitment to professional development is primarily intended to
benefit students.
The relative significance of data on student
achievement starts at twenty-five percent of a teacher’s rating during the
2013–2014 school year and increases to fifty percent during and after
the 2015–2016 school year. 299 This phased process may be intended to
protect teachers from any adverse effects of the evaluation system’s
initial implementation. Nevertheless, by choosing to make student
achievement fifty percent of the measure of teacher performance, the
legislature demonstrated that evaluating and enhancing teachers’ skills
primarily is a means to help students.
Michigan’s layoff and recall provisions further reveal that students,
not teachers, are the primary intended beneficiaries of teacher
performance evaluations. Layoffs and recalls must be based on
“retaining effective teachers” and must assure that teachers with
“ineffective” ratings do not get preference over those with higher
ratings. 300 The majority basis for layoff and recall decisions must be
individual teacher performance, which is determined predominantly by
evidence of student growth. 301 Michigan’s layoff and recall provisions
further demonstrate that the state’s performance evaluation system,
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

Id.
Id. § 380.1249(2)(b)(i)–(iii).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 380.1249(2)(a)(i).
Id. § 380.1248(1)(b).
Id. § 380.1248(1)(b)(i)(A)–(D).
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including professional development opportunities, is designed primarily
to benefit students. Accordingly, depriving tenured teachers of
employment would not impose an atypical and significant hardship on
teachers giving rise to an interest in employment protected by due
process.
iii. Colorado
Although Colorado’s scheme includes provisions more favorable to
teachers as compared to the schemes in Illinois and Michigan, other
provisions show that the legislature intended primarily to benefit
students rather than teachers. Like other states, Colorado’s just-cause
dismissal provision gives teachers job security compared to at-will
employment. 302 The Colorado scheme also gives teachers some
protection in the event of layoffs by requiring school districts to include
teachers in policymaking related to layoff decisions. 303 Additionally,
one express purpose of Colorado’s performance evaluation system is to
measure teachers’ professional growth and development. 304 The
legislature created a “council for educator effectiveness” to give
teachers “meaningful opportunity” to improve performance and share
“effective practices” with other teachers. 305 All evaluations must
include an “improvement plan” that recommends how to enhance
performance, including through education and training. 306 Teachers
who receive “ineffective” ratings may be given a remediation plan and
the opportunity to improve their rating. 307 These provisions augment
teachers’ skills and protect them from removal based upon performance.
However, other Colorado provisions provide context that shows that
the legislature primarily intended to benefit students. Another purpose
of the council for educator effectiveness is to assure that at least fifty
percent of teacher evaluations are based on measures of student
academic growth. 308 Another provision independently requires that
student academic growth make up fifty percent of teachers’ ratings. 309
Moreover, the goal of teachers’ evaluations is to “improve[e] student
academic
growth.” 310
Accordingly, Colorado’s professional
302. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-63-301 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 2 of First Reg. Sess.
Gen. Assembly (2013)).
303. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(III)(B).
304. Id. § 22-9-106(1)(d).
305. Id. § 22-9-105.5(2)(c).
306. Id. § 22-9-106(3)(a)–(b).
307. Id. § 22-9-106(4.5)(b).
308. Id. § 22-9-105.5(2)(c).
309. Id. § 22-9-106(1)(e)(II).
310. Id. § 22-9-105.5(3)(a).
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development measures ultimately and primarily are intended to benefit
students.
Other Colorado provisions further undercut any argument that the
legislature primarily intended to benefit teachers. One provision bars
the use of seniority to determine whom to layoff, except as a tie breaker
and only if doing so “is in the best interest of the students enrolled in the
school district.” 311 More significantly, principals may refuse to fill job
vacancies with even well-qualified applicants, showing that providing
teachers job security was not the primary intent of Colorado’s
scheme. 312 Although rejected teachers who have an “effective rating”
are placed in a “priority hiring pool,” 313 even those teachers are placed
on unpaid leave after the longer of twelve months or two hiring
cycles. 314 Therefore, although teachers technically can be dismissed
only for just cause, including poor performance, principals can bar even
highly rated teachers from active service and relegate them to an unpaid
status that is similar to unemployment. This power undercuts teachers’
real job security and calls into question whether the legislature intended
to confer any such benefit at all. As a result, deprivation of tenured
teachers’ employment pursuant to Colorado’s scheme does not impose
an atypical and significant hardship that triggers procedural due process
rights.
iv. Idaho
Compared to Illinois, Michigan, and Colorado, few Idaho provisions
could be construed as conferring a benefit on teachers. As in other
states, teachers may not be suspended or dismissed at will, 315 which
gives teachers a measure of job security during a contract term.
Additionally, teachers with grandfathered tenure status have a right to
contract renewal, 316 but the benefit of that right is diluted by the board
of trustees’ unilateral power to change the salary and duration of a
renewable contract. 317 Although these provisions give teachers some
job security, they do not show strong legislative intent to benefit
teachers.
311. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV) (emphasis added).
312. See id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(I).
313. See id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(III)(A) (“Any active nonprobationary teacher who was
deemed effective during the prior school year and has not secured a mutual consent placement
shall be a member of a priority hiring pool . . . .”).
314. Id. § 22-63-202(2)(c.5)(IV).
315. IDAHO CODE § 33-513(5) (2012), available at http://www.legislature.idaho.gov/idstat/
Title33/T33.htm (current through 2012 legislative session).
316. Id. § 33-515(2).
317. Id. § 33-515(3).
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More glaringly, the legislature attempted to deny teachers procedural
due process protection by expressly disclaiming any property interest in
teachers’ employment. Under the intended benefit factor analysis, these
disclaimers are clear evidence of legislative intent. 318 Although a
federal court, not the state, ultimately has the power to determine
whether federal constitutional law recognizes a protected interest, 319 the
intended benefit factor seeks to honor legislative intent. Idaho’s
disclaimers are highly relevant to application of the intended benefit
factor. Absent countervailing substantive evidence of legislative intent
primarily to confer a benefit on teachers, the Idaho legislature’s express
disclaimer of any protected property interest is sufficient to find that the
legislature did not primarily intend to benefit teachers.
Moreover, the substance of Idaho’s scheme shows that the legislature
primarily intended to benefit students. Teacher performance ratings in
Idaho must be at least fifty percent based on “objective measures of
growth in student achievement.” 320 Idaho’s predominant focus on
student achievement demonstrates that evaluating and improving
teacher performance primarily is a means to improve students’
educational growth. This student-focused mentality, combined with
Idaho’s express intent not to give teachers a protected property interest
in employment, shows that the legislature primarily intended to benefit
students, not teachers. Thus, depriving tenured teachers of employment
based upon performance would not impose an atypical and significant
hardship on teachers that would give rise to a protected interest in
employment.
v. Florida
The totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the Florida
legislature primarily intended its scheme governing public teacher
employment to benefit students. Nevertheless, some provisions benefit
teachers. Like the other states analyzed in this Article, Florida’s scheme
limits dismissal of teachers to “just cause,” 321 which gives Florida
318. Whereas under the Roth/Perry approach, such disclaimers may not be effective to
prevent creation of a property interest. One of the Court’s chief complaints in Conner about the
Roth/Perry approach was the possibility that an independent source of authority inadvertently
could create a property interest in a benefit, even when a state did not intend to confer that benefit
on the regulated party. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 481–82 (1995). Application of the
Roth/Perry approach to the Idaho scheme could lead to just that disfavored result. By contrast,
application of the intended benefit factor would avoid that result, which further supports the
conclusion that the Court could abandon the Roth/Perry analysis and use the intended benefit
factor to determine the presence of due process rights in the public employment context.
319. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756–57 (2005).
320. IDAHO CODE § 33-514(4).
321. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 1012.335(4) (West 2011).
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teachers job security during the term of their employment contract.
Additionally, certain provisions give teachers modest professional
development benefits. School districts should provide “appropriate”
professional development opportunities, and must provide
recommendations and support to teachers who receive poor ratings to
help improve performance. 322 Florida’s scheme also involves teachers
in the process of forming evaluation standards. 323 These provisions
grant benefits that enhance teachers’ professional skills and job security.
However, compared to Illinois and Michigan in particular, Florida’s
professional development provisions are vague, leaving the details to
local school districts that may not implement effective professional
development programs. 324 Moreover, Florida’s emphasis on teacher
assistance and support is comparatively modest. Therefore, although
Florida’s regime includes professional development that may benefit
teachers, Florida’s commitment to professional development is
relatively weak.
Other provisions strongly suggest that the Florida legislature
primarily intended to benefit students, not teachers. Florida’s scheme
evaluates teacher performance “for the purpose of increasing student
learning growth by improving the quality of instructional,
administrative, and supervisory services.” 325 Florida makes explicit
that teacher enrichment is a means to benefit students, not a freestanding goal that primarily benefits teachers (whereas this provision
can only be inferred from other states’ regimes). This relationship
between enhancing instruction and improving student learning growth
recurs throughout Florida’s scheme. Moreover, the evaluation system
must support effective instruction, student learning growth, and include
a process for monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of the system
in carrying out its goals. 326
Other provisions also show that Florida’s scheme was not primarily
intended to benefit teachers. Similar to Michigan, Colorado, and Idaho,
at least fifty percent of teacher evaluations must be based on student
learning growth. 327 Also, all teachers hired after July 1, 2011, must
initially receive one-year contracts. 328 Although teachers in Florida

322. Id. § 1012.34(2)(b).
323. Id. § 1012.34(2)(e).
324. Id. § 1012.34(2)(b).
325. Id. § 1012.34(1)(a) (emphasis added).
326. Id. § 1012.34(2)(a), (h).
327. Id. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1). If less than three years of data about students is available, the
percentage may be reduced to not less than forty percent. Id. § 1012.34(3)(a)(1)(a).
328. Id. § 1012.335(2)(c).

1_CAMILLUCCI

2013]

3/9/2013 1:31 PM

Regretting Roth

645

may not be dismissed during a contract term without just cause, renewal
of annual contracts depends on a district superintendent’s
recommendation and satisfaction of performance-based conditions. 329
Moreover, the school board need not renew a teacher’s contract even if
the teacher receives a recommendation and qualifying performance
ratings. 330 As a result, Florida teachers have little job security, which
strongly suggests that teachers are not the primary intended beneficiary
of Florida’s performance-evaluation scheme. Finally, in the event of
layoffs, school employees must be retained based on “educational
program needs” and performance evaluations, with lowest-performing
employees released first. 331 This provision focuses on how best to meet
the educational needs of students.
The totality of the circumstances shows that the legislature did not
intend its scheme primarily to benefit teachers.
Consequently,
depriving teachers of employment pursuant to that scheme would not
impose an atypical and significant hardship that would give teachers
due process rights in employment.
vi. Oklahoma
Oklahoma’s regime decisively demonstrates that the legislature’s
primary purpose was to benefit students, not teachers. Nevertheless, the
scheme contains some evidence of intent to benefit teachers. For one,
Oklahoma’s just-cause provision limits the circumstances under which
teachers may be dismissed and therefore gives teachers relative job
security compared to at-will employment. Additionally, Oklahoma
gives teachers means to enhance their professional skills. Similar to
Illinois, Michigan, and Colorado, Oklahoma incorporates remediation
plans and instructional coaching into the performance evaluation
process and requires administrators to make a reasonable effort to assist
teachers to improve their ratings within a reasonable time. 332 These
provisions tend to support the inference that the legislature intended to
confer benefits on teachers.
The Oklahoma scheme also demonstrates the legislature’s desire to
comply with federal due process requirements based on the current
Roth/Perry standard. These provisions, however, are not evidence of
legislative intent to benefit teachers. Before removal, tenured teachers
must receive notice of their right to a hearing, where “the teacher shall
be entitled to all rights guaranteed under the circumstances by the
329.
330.
331.
332.

Id.
See id.
Id. § 1012.33(5).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-101.16(B)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Sess.).
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United States Constitution and the Constitution of Oklahoma.” 333 The
purpose of such hearings is to ensure “the essential pretermination due
process requirements of notice and an opportunity to respond.” 334
While these provisions recognize constitutional protection “guaranteed
to teachers under the circumstances,” 335 they do not purport to create
any independent substantive benefit. Therefore, these requirements are
not relevant to application of the intended benefit factor, which inquires
into the legislature’s intent to benefit teachers, not the legislature’s
understanding of tenured teachers’ due process rights under the
Roth/Perry approach. 336
Elsewhere, the Oklahoma scheme makes student academic
performance the top priority, thus clearly demonstrating a primary
intent to benefit students rather than teachers. The performance
evaluation system’s purpose is to “provide feedback to improve student
learning and outcomes.” 337 The required composition of teachers’
performance ratings corroborates that purpose. Half of a teacher’s
performance rating must be based on quantitative factors: thirty-five
percent of the rating must be based on “student academic growth” data,
and fifteen percent must be based on “other academic
measurements.” 338 The other half of each rating must be based on
qualitative components, including “observable and measurable
classroom practices that are correlated to student performance
success.” 339 Thus, unlike the other states discussed in this Article, in
which student academic growth or achievement must be fifty percent or
less of a teacher’s performance rating, in Oklahoma nearly all of a
teacher’s performance rating is correlated to student outcomes. This
feature unambiguously demonstrates a primary intent to benefit
students, not teachers.
As a result, removing tenured teachers for poor performance would
not be an atypical and significant hardship that would give teachers an
interest in employment protected by due process.

333. Id. § 70-6-101.26(A) (emphasis added).
334. Id. § 6-101.3(6) (eff. July 1, 2012).
335. Id. § 70-6-101.26(A) (emphasis added).
336. The Oklahoma legislature could not have intended its recognition of tenured teachers’
procedural due process rights under the Roth/Perry approach to confer any due process right on
teachers. It would have known that whether teachers have a protected interest in employment is
not determined by the process to which teachers are entitled. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985).
337. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-101.16(B)(2) (emphasis added).
338. Id. § 6-101.16(B)(4)(a).
339. Id. § 6-101.16(B)(5) (emphasis added).

1_CAMILLUCCI

2013]

3/9/2013 1:31 PM

Regretting Roth

647

CONCLUSION
Conner and Gonzales clearly indicate the Court’s dissatisfaction with
the Roth/Perry approach. The question for the Court is how it can
address concerns about the Roth/Perry method in the context of public
teachers’ employment interest without departing from its due process
tradition and diminishing its institutional integrity. The categorical
rules depriving public employees of speech and class-of-one equal
protection rights in Ceballos and Engquist, respectively, if imported to
the due process setting, would suffer from that deficiency. Fortunately
for the Court, it can draw upon Conner to develop an alternative
framework to the Roth/Perry approach that has roots in the Court’s due
process tradition: the atypical and significant hardship standard
implemented by the intended benefit factor. In short, the Court can
address the flaws it has perceived after forty years of experience with
the Roth/Perry approach without exposing itself to accusations that it
has divined a new rule from the ether.
Although the atypical and significant hardship framework and
intended benefit factor have roots in due process precedent, departure
from the Roth/Perry approach nevertheless would likely provoke an
uproar. Application of the intended benefit factor would have a
profound effect on tenured public teachers in many states. In all six
states examined in this Article, tenured public teachers would lose due
process protection of employment. As more states adopt performancebased schemes governing employment of public teachers, it is
reasonable to predict that tenured public teachers in the vast majority of
states would suffer the same fate. As recent events in Wisconsin
demonstrate, at least some state officials may wish to strip public
teachers of statutory and contractual protections that arose in part from
the widespread belief following Roth and Perry that tenured public
teachers have a constitutional right to due process before removal. 340
State fiscal crises could further encourage state officials to reduce the
amount of process afforded to public teachers, thereby reducing
administrative costs. Adoption of the atypical and significant hardship
standard and intended benefit factor would permit such officials to
eliminate procedural protections provided by statute and contract. In
such an event, tenured public teachers, and perhaps other public
employees, would have no constitutional backstop to protect their
340. See Peter Whoriskey & Dan Balz, Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker’s Victory Deals Blow to
Unions, WASH. POST (June 6, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-0606/business/35459755_1_unions-collective-bargaining-rights-rights-for-state-workers. See also
Tom Cohen, Walker’s Victory Could Bring More Efforts to Weaken Public Unions, CNN (June 6,
2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/06/politics/wisconsin-recall-unions/index.html.
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interest in employment.
In light of this possibility, assuming that tenured public teachers wish
to retain a protected interest in employment, teacher unions should
negotiate for provisions in state legislative schemes that demonstrate
legislative intent primarily to benefit teachers.
From unions’
perspective, less than fifty percent of teachers’ evaluation ratings should
be based on measures of student achievement. Additionally, union
leaders should assure that teachers retain just-cause dismissal provisions
and other mechanisms that give teachers job security. Finally, unions
should seek robust professional development and support opportunities,
especially for teachers who receive low performance ratings, that not
only help teachers to improve their skills but also insert extra layers of
protection between a low rating and an adverse employment decision.
State legislatures, on the other hand, first must decide whether they
wish to deprive public teachers of due process protection. Some state
legislatures, such as those in Idaho and Florida, clearly wish to do so.
Cynically, one might assume that all legislatures do, if only to reduce
the administrative costs of providing teachers with the opportunity for a
hearing. Some legislatures, however, may not wish to leave teachers
unprotected for political or policy reasons. Some legislators are closely
aligned with teachers; others may wish to retain due process protection
as a benefit to help induce talented individuals to accept relatively lowpaying teaching jobs.
Legislatures that wish to deny teachers due process protection should
ensure that their legislative scheme is replete with evidence of a primary
intent to benefit students, not teachers. The most effective way to do
this is to base teachers’ performance ratings largely on student test
scores. Official statements of intent also would be relevant evidence
under the intended benefit factor analysis. Legislatures that wish to
preserve teachers’ due process rights should do the opposite.
The Court’s adoption of the intended benefit factor undoubtedly
would harm many tenured teachers because they would lose a
previously possessed constitutional right. The unanswered question is
whether that harm will be offset by any gains in student achievement
brought about by the widespread use of performance-based employment
schemes. That question may take many years to answer. The net social
gain or loss resulting from the convergence of the intended benefit
factor and performance-based public teacher employment schemes will
not be known for some time, if ever.

